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Above: May W. Preston, Tower, Monument Park, Oil on
board 8-518" x 10-518", Hirschi & Adler Galleries, N.Y.
Cover: Robert Henri, Ship in Bay, Oil on canvas, 15" x
19-1/4". Hirschi & Adler Galleries, N.Y.
The above paintings are from a VU 125th Anniversary
exhibit remembering the years 1890-1920 as seen in
American Impressionist paintings. The exhibit, Bright
Prospects- Nature as Sunlight, was organized by the Paine
Art Center and Arboretum, Oshkosh, WI. It is being
shown at VU from Jan. 10- Feb. 5, and at VU will include the VU impressionist paintings by Karl Anderson,
Childe Hassam, and Robert Reid.
RHWB
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CORRESPONDENCE
The Cresset welcomes letters to the
Editor. Restrictions on space require
that letters be as concise as possible,
and they are subject to editing for brevity. Letters intended for publication
should include the name and address
of the sender.

To the Editor of The Cresset:

When moral issues become political footballs, opposing sides tend to
resort to simplistic positions and
muddled rhetoric. So one looks to
responsible journals for recognition
of the complexity of the issues and
a clarity which will begin to do some
unmuddling! It was with that hope
that I began reading "The Abortion
Muddle" (In Luce Tua, October,
1984). What I encountered, however,
was more confusion than clarity in a
not unbiased editorial. Granted, the
abortion issue does seem peculiarly
able to render one baffled and/or
bullheaded, but this is all the more
reason to work hard at achieving
clarity and sympathetic understanding.
First of all, Geraldine Ferraro's
position, which you attack, is an
attempt to delimit matters of private
and personal choice from those of
the public domain and legislation.
Whether justifiable or not, this
should not suggest, as you indicate,
that her position involves "personal"
opposition to, but "public support
of" abortion. Rather, it suggests support for a public policy which allows
for some private moral choice in
this matter. That her faith commitment would dictate her personal
choice, and that this particular viewpoint is shared especially by other
January, 1985

Catholics, is in no way affected by
the Catholic Church's view that this
conclusion should be reached by
any and all rational persons. The
assertion that there are natural
(moral) laws is itself a statement of
faith of this particular religious community. And of course the question
of when a human life, in the sense
of a subject of moral rights, etc.,
begins is a matter of theological and
philosophical dispute!
Nevertheless, you are right to
question the abortion decision as
simply a matter of private choice.
It is an issue of public concern and,
perhaps, even legislative involvement. But the problem is with the
extent to which it should be considered a matter of private morals
or public legislation. This may vary
with the circumstances and stage of
development of the fetus. Your siding with the "pro-life" argument
that it cannot be considered a private
issue "because it involves the taking
of other innocent life" simply begs
the question of the fetus' personhood. You offer no argument. Now,
clearly the fetus is a human being
in the sense of its being offspring of
members of the species homo sapiens.
But is the fetus at all stages of its
development a human being in
what might be called the moral
sense? Is this being a possessor of
rights, or of claims to life, sufficient
to outweigh other claims or rights
of the mother? These difficult questions are not resolved by talking
about fetuses as the "others" that
make abortion a public issue.
Second, your dismissal of arguments for the moral justifiability of
abortion is unfair. What defense are
we given for your claim that "the
only coherent moral argument in
favor of free choice on abortion in-

valves the assumption that fetal life
is not human life"? What about argument that the fetus, though human,
is not fully a person with rights? Or
the view that its claims to life, as a
potential person, are weaker than
those of actual persons? Or, the arguments concerning the broader
consequences of unwanted children
on the world's diminishing resources? These arguments may not
establish free choice in every case
of an abortion decision, and they
may not be conclusive, but are they
incoherent?
What does border on incoherence
is your drawing a parallel between
the choice involved in abortion
cases and that denied in ~uch matters as slavery and racial discrimination. In the latter cases clearly we
are dealing with full-fledged per~
sons with moral rights; in the abortion issue that is in dispute. If the
issue were so clear-cut as this, you
surely would not have what you call
the "ambivalence" of the American
public. (And on that, why should it
be considered ambivalent to oppose
a ban on all abortions and yet also
oppose abortion-on-demand? That
seems to be a perfectly consistent
position to me.)
The upshot of all of this would
seem to me to be reservation about
supporting an amendment which
would cater to the kind of muddleheaded campaigning on this issue
that we've already experienced. I
agree that if we seek an informed
consensus of the American people
on abortion (a highly unlikely prospect), the on ly hope is if "the arguments . . . on either side are presented to them with intellectual and
moral clarity." But your editorial
is a clear indication to me that even
the hope of such intellectual and
moral clarity is slim indeed!
Mark 0. Gilbertson
Dept. of Theology and Philosophy
Texas Lutheran College
Seguin, Texas
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James Nuechterlein responds:

At the risk of adding to the
muddle on this issue, let me respond
as briefly as possible to Mark Gilbertson's points.
1. I find it hard to follow Mr.
Gilbertson's defense of Geraldine
Ferraro. Ms. Ferraro concedes that
abortion-on-demand is morally
wrong according to her own beliefs
because it involves the taking of innocent life, but she supports it as
public policy. She defends this apparently contradictory position by
attributing her personal views to a
"gift of faith" that is hers as a Roman
Catholic; not all have that gift, she
says, and she does not want to impose her moral/religious beliefs on
others. But, as I pointed out, the
Catholic position on abortion does
not rest on faith. Catholics believe
that abortion can be shown to be
wrong by the light of reason, unaided by faith. Would it not then
follow that Ms. Ferraro has a moral
duty to try to show others that abortion-on-demand
is
objectively
wrong, that it is not a purely personal matter, and that it should not
be sanctioned in law? Yet she does
none of these things. Her position
does seem to me to be incoherent.
2. I was wrong, however, to say
that the only coherent moral argument in favor of free choice on abortion involves the assumption that
fetal life is not human life. Coherence-in the sense of logical consistency- is not the central issue.
Many morally frivolous arguments
are consistent within their own
terms and assumptions. My language in that instance was imprecise, though it did not affect my central argument.
3. Mr. Gilbertson's quarrel with
me focuses on the question of
whether the fetus-which he concedes is a human being- is a person
with moral rights. All his objections
save one come down to that issue.
(The exception refers to "the broad4

er consequences of unwanted children on the world's diminishing resources." Does Mr. Gilbertson really
want to suggest that "unwanted children" can be got rid of because they
make a claim on resources that
others [the "wanted"?] also make
claim to?)
The fetus , Mr. Gilbertson suggests, may lack compelling claims
to life because it is not yet a moral
personality. (That is not Mr. Gilbertson's term, but it does seem implicit in what he says.) That argument may be intuitively persuasive
to many, but consider its implications. If the claims to life of the fetus
may be ignored or restricted because of its lack of full moral (or
other) development , what of the
claims of the newborn infant? Abortion-on-demand allows the killing
of human creatures who are developmentally distinct from infants
only in the sense that they exist inside the womb rather than outside
it. Many pro-choice arguments
would in fact justify infanticide as
well as abortion.
This suggests that Mr. Gilbertson
has his burden-of-the-argument perspective backwards. If we do concede (as he does) that the fetus is a
human being, should not the presumption be that it has moral claims
to life that cannot rightly be overridden by, say, claims to convenience or privacy or the right of personal choice on behalf of the
mother? If we are indeed uncertain
as to when life that has legitimate
moral claims begins, should we not
put the burden of proof on those
who would interpret those claims
restrictively rather than broadly?
That would seem to follow from the
common moral perception that protection of innocent life is at the very
center of our moral obligations.
Mr. Gilbertson concludes that
uncertainty on abortion leads to
reservation about supporting the
Hatch amendment (which, to repeat,
would not ban abortions but would

simply leave the matter open for
democratic resolution at both the
state and federal levels). I find his
position logically and morally unpersuasive. Today abortion-ondemand leads to the death of some
1.6 miJ!ion fetuses per year. Mr. Gilbertson is apparently able to live
with ·that reality with equanimity.
I consider it a moral horror.
Cl

When I Consider
Of course, He created made man ,
wombed womban,
planned planets,
semened seas,
rooted growth,
inspired breath.
He caused all causes,
created all creatures,
fathered all fathers ,
bred all breeds.
Of course,
but how creative His creation,
how original the origins
of galaxies,
volcanoes,
Venus fly traps,
mosquitoes,
manHis improvising so ingenious,
His inventions so inventive,
His productions so prolific.
Of course, creative,
even in gift packaging,
conceived to catch the eye,
yet fully functional the Big Dipper,
aspened hillside,
bananas,
eggs,
Evedone by the wildest stretch
of His imagination.

Bernhard Hillila
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IN LUCE TUA
Comment on C ontemporary Affairs by the Editor
T he United States and South Africa
The ambiguous nature of political morality is nowhere more clear for Americans today than in the
matter of American policy toward South Africa. If in
the area of moral attitudes the issue presents some rare
simplicities, in the area of proposed action it offers
only a range of unpalatable and unsatisfactory options.
We begin with the obvious. Apartheid is a moral disgrace that degrades South Africa's blacks and corrupts
its whites. Its underlying racist philosophy requires
condemnation by all civilized people; it is particularly
abhorrent that any who call themselves Christian could
defend it or even acquiesce in it. For whites-and , to a
limited degree, for Asians and Coloreds (mixed races)South Africa offers itself as a place of economic opportunity and political and legal guarantees. But for the
70 per cent of the population that is black, the opportunities are severely restricted and the guarantees nonexistent.
White South Africans enjoy full democratic rights.
Blacks endure authoritarian oppression. The state decrees where they can live and work and who they can
socialize with or marry. It breaks up families through
residential regulations and its "homelands" policy has
uprooted millions of people and relocated them in
barren bantustans. It manages its program of social
control with the standard apparatus of oppression:
censorship, internal passports, restriction of movement
and association, secret police, political arrests, detention without trial. It is a highly efficient tyranny.
But not perfectly efficient. Though the white Afrikaners who rule the country through the Nationalist
party have so far managed to contain black protest, they
have never been able to eliminate it completely. The
civil unrest in recent months has been the worst in eight
years; riots and labor conflicts have left over 150 killed,
hundreds injured, and some 1,100 in detention. Protest
in South Africa has spread abroad, and there have been
mass protests and arrests at the South African embassy
in Washington and at its consulates across the country.
The Nobel Peace Prize awarded to South African Anglican Bishop Desmond Tutu for his anti-apartheid crusade has dramatized the racial question and reawakened
world indignation over the issue.
But to what effect? It has become something of a political fashion to get arrested in protest against apartheid.
That may have its purpose as a statement of moral principle, but what are the prospects that such actions will
work to change the attitude of the government in PreJanuary, 1985

toria and improve conditions for South Africa's blacks?
The question takes on special urgency when posed in
conjunction with the matter of official American policy
toward South Africa. The Reagan Administration has
followed a program of "constructive engagement,"
under which it minimizes public criticism of South
Africa in the expressed hope that quiet diplomacy and
friendly urging will prove more effective than would
stern rhetoric or economic and political sanctions in
moving South Africa toward easing its racial policies.
That policy has come under considerable criticism

Special Notice
This issue of The Cresset will have more readers
than any previous issue in our history. It is being sent
not only to our regular subscribers but to all the alumni
of Valparaiso University. This effort- which will be
repeated three times during the course of 1985-is an
experimental venture on the part of the Board of Directors of the VU Alumni Association, and it requires a
word of explanation.
The Alumni Association offers these four issues of
The Cresset free of charge to alumni as part of its
50th anniversary celebration. It seeks to introduce The
Cresset to alumni to provide some evidence of the
intellectual ferment that exists at the University.
The Cresset, although it is published at and by Va lparaiso University, is not a University journal. It is
instead a "review of literature, the arts, and public af
fairs" that addresses the world of ideas and events from
a Lutheran Christian perspective. The University sponsors it, and many of its contributors are faculty or alumm; but it in no way necessarily reflects the official views,
or even the preponderance of opinion, at VU. The
opinions expressed in its pages reflect only the views of
their authors. Readers may on occasion find those opinions wrongheaded or perverse; we hope they will regularly find them stimulating and provocative. A journal
of ideas that Jails to provoke Jails its mission.
The Alumni Association hopes in this one-year experiment to provide a service to the alumm; The
Cresset, and the University. Both the Association and
The Cresset are eager to learn from alumni their
response to this venture. Comments, favorable or not,
should be addressed to Walter Kretzmann, President,
VU Alumni Association, Valparaiso University, Valparaiso, Indiana 46383.
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from the start from those who see it as an implicit signal
to South Africa that it need feel itself under no pressure
to dismantle the apartheid system. When Bishop Tutu
denounced American policy as "immoral, evil, and totally un-Christian ," President Reagan moved, if not
to reconstruct his program, at least to issue his first
clear personal statement (the Administration had
issued similar official statements earlier) that the U.S.
looks on racism "with repugnance" and grieves "over
the human and spiritual cost of apartheid in South
Africa."
If Mr. Reagan hoped thereby to ease criticism of his
policies, he was mistaken. Bishop Tutu has since raised
the possibility of racial upheaval in South Africa and
has expressed doubts whether his nation can survive
four more years of the Reagan policies. He has gone so
far as to blame the Administration for the continuation
of apartheid. If the United States took a firmer line
against South Africa, he has suggested, the rest of the
world would follow suit. That would presumably force
Pretoria to move toward genuine reform .
Defenders of the Administration find such criticism
extreme and unrealistic. They argue that South Africa
has made significant reforms in recent years and that
Bishop Tutu's charge that things are worse than ever is
flatly wrong. There are, in fact, signs of improvement.
Much, though not all, of segregation in public facilities
-petty apartheid-has been done away with. Labor
laws have been revised to allow blacks to join unions.
Over the last decade , real income for blacks has risen
substantially while that of whites has modestly declined ,
although white income remains four times greater than
that of blacks. South Africa has also in recent years
shown itself more ready than it had been earlier to
negotiate constructive relationships with its black neighbor states. Reform is real, if limited, and President P. W.
Botha has promised that more is to come. Indeed, reform has already created a backlash in the Afrikaner
community: bitter-enders have created a new Conservative party to resist the Nationalists' mild innovations.
Critics must understand, Reagan defenders say, the
limits of U.S. influence. South Africa is determined to
go its own way without regard to the attitudes of the
rest of the world. Sanctions would be ineffectual, even
counter-productive; their only significant effect would
be to make life harder than it already is for the African
population. Attempts at diplomatic isolation would simply reinforce white intransigence as would harsh public
denunciations of apartheid. The best hope for continuing reform , this argument concludes, remains a policy
of friendly persuasion. It may not satisfy our moral instincts, but it in fact offers the only realistic path towards
constructive change of South Africa's racial policies.
That is not, in many ways, an implausible case. It is
6

at least arguable that reform lies more readily down the
road of constructive engagement than any other. But if
one wants to argue moral realism, one must at least be
realistic, and in this case that requires a clear understanding of the very different meanings that attach to
the word "reform" iri the South African context.
Blacks in South Africa and liberals everywhere see as
the eventual goal of reform a complete end to apartheid
and its replacement by a policy of full racial integration
and equality. And that is precisely what white South
Africans are determined, at all costs, to avoid. They will
never accept a one person, one vote political formula.
For them, reform means continued strides toward separate development, under which blacks in the south of
Africa will be citizens in one of a number of quasi-independent bantustans while South Africa itself will eventually become an overwhelmingly white nation. That
is what the homelands policy is all about: it envisions
economic cooperation between the races in southern
Africa but separate political development, and all of it
dominated for the foreseeable future by whites. That is
worlds removed from the dream of a fully integrated
South Africa that opponents of apartheid have in mind.
The question for Americans is whether they can live
morally with a policy that will lead , at the very best, to so
truncated a version of racial reform. For most of us the
instinctive response surely is to say no . We do not want
to be complicit in such a dubious enterprise. Yet it is
precisely our moral dilemma that workable alternatives
do not readily come to mind.
Even if American influence on South Africa were not
as limited as it is , we would be uncertain what to prescribe. White South Africans' concerns over the implications of political equality are understandable. Their
cynical argument that democracy in Africa means one
person, one vote, one time has a good deal of empirical
support. To them , our urgings toward equality appear
an invitation to commit collective political and economic suicide, and we should not be surprised that they decline the invitation. Yet their survival depends on preservation of an immoral social order.
There we are. We apparently can do little to help
South Africa's blacks and we must do nothing to reassure
its whites. Incremental movement towards genuine reform appears unlikely at best, while militant protest
would only eventuate in a bloodbath from which the
whites would almost certainly emerge on top in any
case. In such grim circumstances, perhaps the best policy
would be neither friendly persuasion or active opposition but studious disengagement. That's not much of
a policy and it won't relieve our moral anguish, but at
least it would involve us neither in complicity or illusion. Sometimes negative virtues are all we have.

••
••
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John Strietelmeier

OF ATHENS AND JERUSALEM
Valparaiso University and the LCMS

I need to preface these remarks with a warning about
my competence to deal with this topic and with a series
of factual statements which may provide a context for
you to judge the validity of my observations and conclusions.
Be warned, then, that I am not a historian, but a geograph ically-trai ned journalist. My qualifications for
this assignment are personal, not professional. I have
been, for forty-six years, an observant child of the oftentempestuous marriage of the Valparaiso Athens and the
St. Louis Jerusalem. And as a child I look upon these
oddly-matched parents of mine with a degree both of
pride and of exasperation which would be excessive in
a professional historian.
So much for the warning. Now for some incontrovertible statements of fact:
1. When Valparaiso University was refounded in
1925, all of the members of the Lutheran University
Association and of the Valparaiso University Association were Missouri Synod Lutherans. Nevertheless, the
constitutions of both associations made it clear that the
University was to be owned and controlled by these
associations, and not by the Missouri Synod.
2. At the time of its refounding the University became dependent both for its enrollment and for its funding largely upon members of the Missouri Synod. It
therefore needed to be related, in some formal way, to
the Synod. The Synod created this relationship by recognizing the University as an auxiliary organization.

John Strietelmeier recently 1·etired as Professor of Geography at Valparaiso University. He has also served the Um·versity as Vice President for Academic Affairs and Editor of The
Cresset. This essay was first presented to the University in
October, 1984 as part of a lecture series commemorating the
12Sth anniversary of the University's founding and the 60th
year of its Lutheran association. The Cresset is pleased to
publish the essay because its particular focus has larger implications for church-related higher education in Amen·ca.
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The President of the Synod then appointed a committee
of three which was to serve as I iaison between the Synod
and the University.
3. Later, the Board of Directors of the Synod designated the second Sunday in February as "Valparaiso
University Sunday" and encouraged its congregations
to observe the day by giving tangible expression of
their support of the University.
4. When World War II began, the Board of Directors
of the Synod found it necessary to raise a large amount
of money to support its ministry to members in the
Armed Forces. It therefore asked its auxiliary organizations not to carry on any campaigns for funds during
the war. After the war, Synod recompensed these organizations with a drive for five million dollars. The larger
part of the money raised in this drive went to Valparaiso
University, and it was this money that made possible
the building of the Chapel of the Resurrection.
5. But over the past sixty years support has also
come to the University from the Synod in other ways.
Except for the Music Building and Urschel Hall, all of
the academic buildings on the new campus are gifts of
Missouri Synod individuals and families.
6. The University annually receives funds from the
Federal government, from corporations, from foundations, and from the Valparaiso community. The largest
single annual contribution to the current funds budget
comes, however, from within the Missouri Synod.
7. The largest single category of students at the University each year is always the group from Missouri
Synod homes.
8. Through its seminary in St. Louis, the Synod has
recognized the University by conferring honorary doctorates on three of its presidents: Dr. Kreinheder, Dr.
Kretzmann , and Dr. Huegli.
9. It has also called five Valparaiso faculty members
to the Seminary's faculty : Robert Bertram, Horace
Hummel, Norman Nagel, Jaroslav Pelikan, and Edward Schroeder.
10. The five presidents of the University since 1925
have all been members of the pastoral ministry or the
7

teaching ministry of the Synod.
11. Twenty members of the University's current fulltime faculty are members of the pastoral ministry of
the Synod, and six other full-time faculty members are
members of the teaching ministry of the Synod.
12. The University always has a contingent of students who are preparing for study at the Seminary m
St. Louis.
Those are hard, documentable facts . Bear them m
mind as I turn now to a more subjective account of a
marriage both sorely troubled and immensely fruitful.

•

• •

At one time there were 150 different Lutheran denominations in the United States. Many of them were
organized along ethnic lines. Their members hoped
not only to preserve "God's word and Luther's doctrine
pure," but also the German or Swedish or Norwegian
or Danish or Finnish or Icelandic or Latvian or Slovak
language and cultural heritage.
The laity of these Lutheran denominations fell, for
the most part, into one or another of three broad socioeconomic classes: farmers, small business men , or industrial workers. Here and there, mostly in the Northeast and in certain urban areas of the Midwest, one
could find small but growing cadres of professional
men and community leaders. But the great mass of the
laity in the years just before the First World War had
less than an eighth-grade education. Many still spoke
the language of the "Old Country," at least at home and
in church. And one large segment of Lutheranismdie evangelische-lutherische Synode von Missouri,
Ohio, und anderen Staaten-still spoke it in school, the
parochial school which provided so many of us with a
rigorous secular education plus a thorough grounding
in Bible history, Lutheran hymnody, and the straight
scoop on such notorious heretics as Pope Leo X, Erasmus of Rotterdam , Huldreich Zwingli, Samuel
Schmucker, Martin Grabau, and Harry Emerson
Fosdick.
By 1925, all of the major Lutheran bodies except the
Missouri Synod had established colleges of their own
for the higher education of their laity. Some of these
colleges had already begun to develop reputations for
providing superior education in the liberal arts. Among
these might be mentioned Gettysburg and Muhlenberg,
deeply rooted in the old Lutheran communities of the
East; Luther, Gustavus Adolphus, Augustana, and St.
Olaf, outposts of the Scandinavian Lutheran culture
which was beginning to impart its particular flavor to
the states of the upper Midwest; and Capital and Wittenberg in Ohio, at that time the nation's heartland.
Conspicuously missing from this list is any institu8

tion of the Missouri Synod. And the reason is-as is
usually the case with the Missouri Synod-theological.
It was not that the Missouri Synod despised education. As I have said, the Synod had established and was ,
at great financial sacrifice, maintaining a parochial
school system which, even at that time, was second in
size only to the Roman Catholic system. It had also
established a system for the training of professional
church workers-preparatory schools scattered across
the northeastern quarter of the nation whose graduates
went on to either of two seminaries or to one of two normal schools.

The parochial schools of the lCMS
provided their students with a
rigorous secular education plus a
thorough grounding in Bible history,
lutheran hymnody, and the straight
scoop on a range of heretics from
Pope leo X to Harry Emerson Fosdick.
But it was not, the Missouri theologians maintained,
the mission of the Church to support secular education
that was not focused directly on the preparation of pastors and teachers. It is true that the proper name of the
Synod's premier seminary was Concordia College and
that its first president, Dr. C.F.W. Walther, had hoped
that his little college would attract general students as
well as theological candidates. But it didn't, and his
successors did not press the point.
Despite one or two desultory attempts to do something about lay higher education under church auspices,
really serious interest in the establishment of an institution for the laity did not develop until the time of the
First World War, when the Missouri Synod was forced
to abandon its German cocoon, when increasing numbers of its young people began attending state colleges
and universities, and when a few lay agitators insisted
on keeping the question of lay higher education on the
Synod's agenda.
The most eloquent, perceptive, and influential critic
of the idea was Dr. Theodore Graebner, one of the editors of The Lutheran Witness. It would be good for us to
listen again to Dr. Graebner's objections to the idea of
a Lutheran University supported by the Church:
1. It is not proper for the Church to sponsor an endeavor for merely "social betterment."
2. It would be discriminatory to maintain educational opportunities from which many of the young people of the Church would have to be excluded because
of poor intellectual ability.
The Cresset
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3. It would cost five million dollars to build the
university plus another five million to endow it.
4. Distance would be a barrier to many young people of the Church if only one university could be established by the Synod.
5. Lutheran university training would confer only
slight benefit upon the student whose morals had already been damaged by attendance at a non-Lutheran
secondary school. (Remember, this was the flapper age!)
6. It was doubtful whether academic freedom could
be maintained in a Christian university.
7. There would be a problem of assembling a faculty
which would conform to the theological standards of
the Missouri Synod.
8. It would be hard to meet state standards in such
theologically troublesome fields as biology, geology,
psychology, and other areas where science and religion
seemed to disagree.
9. The enrollment might prove disappointing since
Lutheran students could not be compelled to attend a
Lutheran university.
I have taken the time to list all of these objections of
Dr. Graebner's because they seem to me prophetic of
the problems and tensions which actually have made
the marriage between the University and the Synod an
uneasy one. From 1925 down to this very day, there
have been those in the Synod who were and are convinced that if this hybrid were really Lutheran, it
wouldn't-indeed couldn't- be a real university. And
there have been, as there still are, those in the University who are persuaded that if the University were ever
to become truly a university, it would cease to be Lutheran.
It didn't help that, when the idea of a Lutheran university finally took form in brick and mortar, it was not
the form of a new institution totally free to create its own
identity, but the form of a 66-year-old institution which
had developed a strong character of its own with traditions and customs and emphases to match. Lutherans
who were well enough off to send their sons and daughters off to college were appalled at the contrast between
the ivy-clad public and private institutions which they
had seen and that broken-down ruin which, as some of
them saw it, their brethren in Indiana had been suckered into buying. They were even more appalled when
they discovered that its faculty and student body included everything from Polish Catholics to free-thinking Masons.
We will be more sympathetic to our critics who question the genuineness of our Lutheranism if we remember that when we first solicited their support as a Lutheran university, we were really Lutheran in name
only. And we will be more appreciative of the heroic
efforts of those early leaders who, with great honesty
January, 19&5

-

-

-

- - - - - -- - - -- - - - - - - - - - - -

and seriousness, addressed the question to which the
Synodical leaders demanded an answer: "What is a
Lutheran University?" Judged by the standards of a
later generation, the question itself may seem naive,
and the answers which our predecessors gave may seem
partial or even wrong. But God be blessed for John C.
Baur, for W.H.T. Dau, for that noble gentleman and
scholar Frederick William Kroencke, for Albert F.
Scribner, and for that little band of young, promising
scholars which included Walter E. Bauer, Karl Henrichs, Walther M. Miller, and Alfred H . Meyer-dedicated young men who, pretty much on their own,
worked their way to a definition of a Lutheran university that enabled them to build an institution which
sees itself as a partner with the Synod in the task of
Christian nurture, rather than a mere agent of the
Synod.
I came upon the scene here a little later, after the
great men I have just mentioned had pretty well persuaded a reluctant Synodical leadership to recognize
that Valparaiso University was an asset that it could not
afford to ignore. I came as a freshman to Valparaiso
chiefly-and I am embarrassed to admit it-because I
had read in the Columbus Evening Republican that Valparaiso University had banned dancing.
The story was garbled, and there is still disagreement
about what actually happened back there in 1938. We
freshmen were given clearly to understand that after
several years of pressure from the Synodical leadership,
the University had agreed to ban dancing on campus.
There apparently was a resolution of the Board of Directors to that effect. If so, there was little or no administrative effort to enforce it. Eventually it became a
dead issue.
Looking back on "the dance question" from the vantage point of our own day, one would be tempted to dismiss it as nothing more than another tempest in a tea
pot. But no Missouri Synod Lutheran who was young
when I was young would be inclined to write it off so
cavalierly.
For out of the depths of Missouri Synod piety the
words still come to haunt me: "Come out from among .
them and be ye separate, saith the Lord, and touch not
the unclean thing; and I will receive you, and will be a
father unto you, and ye shall be my sons and daughters,
saith the Lord Almighty."
The Missouri exclusiveness. The conviction, drilled
into us from home through parochial school and right
on to college that "the friendship of this world is enmity
against God." The perversion of this conviction to include not only the "belly-servers" of this world but
brothers and sisters in Christ whose understanding of
the Gospel differs from ours on one point or another.
And yet the conviction. The world, many of us be9

lieved, did not need just another institution of higher
education sailing in the same direction as all of the rest,
but under a different flag. Lifestyle was not separable
from confession. The offense of the Cross has not ceased
in the twentieth century. It might not pose any real
threat of martyrdom by dungeon , fire, or sword, but it
did expose one to the risk of being labeled an exclusivist, a killjoy, an oddball, a square.

There was no doubt about it, at
least in our minds: God in his
wisdom had chosen to build the new,
American Wittenberg in "a little,
fresh-water college in northern
Indiana." The evidence was all
about us, plain to see.
I remember, with gratitude to God, the great mediators of those days, the men who acted as go-betweens in
the sometimes heated exchanges between the University and the Synodical leadership. Most vividly I remember that great gentleman and churchman, President O.C. Kreinheder, whose nine years as President of
this university were in every true meaning of the phrase
"a living sacrifice." And I remember one of the all-time
greats of this university , Walter G. Friedrich, who became my personal model of the academic man. And
there are so many others, my teachers in my undergraduate years, who were here not to advance their
careers but to fulfill a calling as sacred in their view as
any vocation to the holy ministry. Four I must mention
by name: Erv Goehring, Vera Hahn, Marshall Jox, and
Bert Wehling.
It was my special privilege to serve the University
as student and faculty member through the Kretzmann
years, 1940 to 1968. O.P.'s roots in the Missouri Synod
were as deep as affection and history allowed. And it
was perhaps just because of his unquestioned and unquestioning loyalty to the Synod that he was able to
reach out warmly and unselfconsciously to brethren in
other Lutheran bodies and, beyond them, to the separated brethren and sisters of other Christian traditions.
For a young instructor, eventually exalted to the
dizzying dignity of an associate professor, these were
days when the sun always seemed to rise too late and
set too soon. There was no doubt about it, at least in our
minds: God in His wisdom had chosen to build the new,
American Wittenberg in "a little, fresh-water college
in northern Indiana." The evidence was all about us,
plain to see. O.P. had managed to assemble most of that
great generation of Missouri Synod Wunderkinder at
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Valparaiso right after the War. And what a crew it was!
Some, like Bob Bertram, Ernie Koenker, Les Lange,
Dick Luecke, Jary Pelikan, and Dick Wienhorst, went
on to achieve international recognition as scholars. O.P.
also brought as regular visitors to campus many of the
leading Lutheran scholars of that day, all of them his
personal friends: Conrad Bergendoff, Otto Piper,
Joseph Sittler, Richard Caemmerer, Sr., Paul Bretscher,
Sr., Arthur Carl Piepkorn. And he was personally liked,
although more than a little distrusted, by most of the
leaders of Synod. In his best years, he was probably the
most plagiarized writer in the Lutheran church.
It was during President Kretzmann's long incumbency that the relationship between the University and
the Church took on the form which, in all its essentials,
survives today. O .P.'s counterpart in the Synod through
most of those years was Dr. John W. Behnken, a very
conservative Texan who had some serious reservations
about what was or might be going on at Valparaiso. Dr.
Behnken used occasions such as the annual Reformation
Day convocation to bring us up to date on current heresies and to admonish us to hold fast to orthodox teaching. He was especially disturbed by penistent reports
that biological and geological evolution was being
taught on the campus and he was frank in his disapproval of such goings on . But Dr. Behnken was no witch
hunter.
There were others, though , who were more than willing to undertake that role, and they found at Valparaiso
more than enough witches to hunt. For the University
was on the cutting edge of practically all of the constructive social and theological movements that were
r evitalizing American Lutheranism in the Fifties. It was
here that Andrew Schulze found a home for his Lutheran Human Relations Association, perhaps the most
truly prophetic movement in twentieth-century American Lutheranism. It was here that the much-maligned
"chancel prancers" of the liturgical revival rallied and
gathered strength for their renewal of Lutheran worship and piety. It was here that the Lutheran Deaconess
Association established the training program for their
ministry of compassion. It was here that The Cresset
found shelter and gave a voice to responsible liberalism
in the Church. It was in Valparaiso's theology department that Werner Elert and Leonhardt Goppelt found
sympathetic hearts and ears and, for a while, an audience among American Lutherans.
There was a Lutheran pastor out in California who
saw in all these things the insidious workings of communism on our campus. There was another ideological
chastity examiner in the Chicago area who put our
eminently respectable Dean of the Faculty, Dr. Bauer,
on a list of Lutheran clergymen allegedly sympathetic
to Communism because he had written an article in The
The Cresset

Cresset advocating clemency for the Rosenbergs. There

was, and is, a Lutheran pastor in Missouri who has made
a career of keeping the Church advised of the manifold
aberrations from orthodox teaching which make Valparaiso a continuing menace to confessional Lutheranism.
Hardly a Synodical convention passed in President
Kretzmann's day without some attempt by some individual or group to carry a resolution critical of the University or of one of the various groups and movements
associated with it.
But through it all , the University grew, not only in
size and complexity, but also in favor with the Church
and even with the leadership of the Church. This acceptance was reflected most clearly in the growing willingness of so many Lutherans to entrust their own children
to our care. The roster of the student body came to contain names which echoed the clergy roster of the Synod
itself and some of them were, like their fathers in prep
school days, hellions. The University and the Synod
cooperated in many endeavors, from fund-raising to
the production of instructional materials. Campus leaders were elected or appointed to Synodical boards and
commissions. The University Board held occasional
joint meetings with Synod's Board of Directors. Church
groups used the facilities of the campus for conferences
and seminars. The great, enduring, visible symbol of
this time of friendly cooperation between the University
and the Synod is, as I have said, the Chapel of the Resurrection, which was largely funded by the Synodical
thanksgiving campaign. A less tangible, but no less
meaningful, symbol is the annual Valparaiso University
Sunday, which still calls the attention of Synod's congregations to the accomplishments and needs of the
University.
Upon Dr. Behnken's retirement from the Synodical
presidency, his first vice-president, Dr. Oliver R .
Harms, became president. And in him Valparaiso had
one of the best friends it has ever had. During his short
administration, it seemed that both the University and
the Synod had come of age and were poised on the very
brink of a new era which would see a powerful and responsible Lutheran presence on the American scene.
But the clouds that had been gathering for many years
came together in the late Sixties to create a furious storm
which resulted in Dr. Harms's being replaced as President, by a series of events culminating in the selfimposed exile of the faculty of Concordia Seminary in
St. Louis, and by the secession of a significant number
of leading theological moderates from the Missouri
Synod to form the Association of Evangelical Lutheran
Churches.
By this time, President Kretzmann had retired and
had been succeeded by his close associate and Vice President for Academic Affairs, Dr. A. G. Huegli, a man who
january, 1985

commanded such confidence and respect in the Synod
that he had, just a few years before, been offered its
highest administrative office. Dr. Huegli immediately
found himself beset on two fronts: by the student unrest
which, at that time, was sweeping the country, and by
the theological controversies which seemed literally
to be tearing the Synod apart.
The Synodical situation demanded of the University
much more than a potentially successful strategy for
institutional survival. It demanded the kind of principled action which would safeguard the academic integrity of the University while reasserting its role of
willing servant to the Lutheran community, particularly
to the Missouri Synod. The set of principles which Dr.
Huegli set down in those difficult days to guide the University in its dealings with the conflicting elements in
the Synod continues to illumine the relationship between them.
Chief of these principles is the University's understanding of its role, before God and the Church, as a
university. Not a prep school, not a seminary, not a
Bible college, but a university-obligated, like all true
universities, to test all things and to hold fast to that
which is good.
Secondly, Dr. Huegli reasserted, with the full support

THE CRESSEY
The Question
Of the Ordination
Of Women
The Cresset was pleased to publish the position
papersofTheodoreJungkuntzand Walter E. Keller
on "The Question of the Ordination of Women" in
its regular pages.
In response to reader interest, the Cresset is further
pleased to announce that reprints of both position
papers in one eight-page folio are now available for
congregational and pastoral conference study .
Please accompany reprint orders with a check
payable to the Cresset and mail to:
T he Cresset
Valparaiso University
Valparaiso, Indiana 46383
S ingle Copy, 25C
10 Copies for 20C Eech
100 Cop;.• for 15C Eech
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of the Board of Directors, not only the right but the duty
of those members of the Faculty who were professionally competent in theology to address the matters in
dispute within the Synod-as individuals, obviously,
but as individuals who were members of the University
community.
Thirdly, the University offered its facilities as neutral ground for any attempts the contesting parties
might be willing to make toward discussing their differences and working toward reconciliation.
And finally, faced with the fact that it had good friends
and long-time supporters in both the Missouri Synod
and the AELC, the University refused to identify itself
with either group to the exclusion of the other. Indeed,
it chose the very opposite course. It chose to open new
channels of communication and service with all major
Lutheran denominations.
It would be stretching the truth to say that these policies delighted everybody concerned. But they did
make it clear that the University was not for sale, either
to friend or to adversary. It was gratifying to see how
many of our friends, some of them badly hurt in the
Synodical conflict, understood and even supported the
University's position, despite hopes that they must
have had for stronger, more partisan support. And it
was interesting to see how many of our adversaries,
despite their continuing distrust of our doctrinal soundness, respected our refusal to compromise the academic
integrity of the University.
Dr. Huegli made many other statesmanlike attempts
to play the role of reconciler during those difficult
years. Mostly these attempts involved the invention
of new ways to serve the Synod constructively in areas
where the confessional issue was not at stake. He established a Center for Church Vocations, designed to encourage, recruit, and counsel pre-seminarians, future
parochial school teachers, and future deaconesses. He
raised the funds to support annual conferences on topics
of general concern to the Church such as changing
American lifestyles and the meaning of the Lutheran
confessions for the laity. And he welcomed Lutheran
leaders and groups, whatever their stripe, to campusone of the few places in those embittered days where
any Lutheran leader could be assured of a civil reception, if not necessarily an enthusiastic one.
And through that whole sad period the University
continued and even enlarged a number of its areas of
service to the Lutheran community in America. The
annual Institute of Liturgical Studies and the Church
Music Seminar have become seminal forces in the Lutheran communion and beyond it, touching the piety
and worship of the whole Christian family in America.
The Center for the Study of Campus Ministry, created
by President Huegli, provides a pan-Lutheran forum
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for campus pastors. The Cresset not only survives but
thrives, despite or possibly because of a slight correction in course toward the right.
And the University retains its Lutheran character.
The services of worship in the Chapel of the Resurrection are still at least as recognizably Lutheran as are the
services in any typical Lutheran parish. And the Letters
column of The Torch still bristles with the kind of "Hier
steh' ich" pronouncements that once singed the pages
of Lehre und Wehre and The Lutheran Witness.
But in the Eighties there is much less coming and
going between Valparaiso University and St. Louis than
there was before 1968. And neither the University nor
the Lutheran community assigns any very high priority
to redefining the relationship between them. The Missouri Synod is preoccupied with trying to pull itself together again after the horrors of its internal conflict.
The LCA and the ALC and the AELC are trying to
work out the details of a merger to which they have
already agreed. The Wisconsin Synod thrives in isolation from the rest of the Christian world. The colleges
and universities of the Lutheran denominations are up
to their ears in a struggle to remain viable in a time of
declining enrollments. And the old Lutheran ethnic
communities have all but disappeared in the great ettling basin of American religious and cultural homogenization.
Wise leadership moves, in a time such as this, to
strengthen the ties which bind the University to friends
throughout the Lutheran community and beyond it who
share with us a vision of high learning informed by
high religion. I remember meetings, almost forty years
ago, of a circle of young teachers and graduate students
whom O.P. had gathered around him. It was called the
Palm Grove Group, and we were a rowdy lot. But there
was one of our number who usually sat quietly puffing
on his pipe, listening while the rest of us talked. Once
in a while he would throw in a reasoned comment or
ask a pregnant question. His name was Robert Schnabel,
the same Robert Schnabel who today is the principal
trustee of that legacy which we are celebrating this year.
Precisely what his administration will contribute to the
conservation and enlargement of that legacy it is too
early, at this point, to say. But President Schnabel knows
and loves the Church, he is trusted by the Synod, and
he is a solid academic man, committed to the ideal of
Christian higher education. He is also the hardestworking man I have ever known.
I think it is safe to predict that out of such a combination of gifts and experience, and under the continuing
favor of God, will come new blessings, more than we
can ask or think, for Valparaiso University, for the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, and for the whole
Lutheran community.

...••
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Jeff Smith

THE SIXTIES REVISITED
Reflections on the M eaning of the Movement

"The Movement" began at Sather Gate, the University of California, Berkeley, 1964, and ended at Blanket
Hill, site of "Tent City," Kent State University, 1977.
The current year looks back on both events. This past
fall marked the Berkeley Free Speech Movement's
twentieth anniversary, and this spring will see the fifteenth-year commemoration of the Kent State killings
that later gave rise to Tent City. The dual anniversary
calls us to reflect again on the Movement. And with
their startling reminder that FSM and Kent State were
far closer to each other in time than either is to the
present, the dates involved call us to reflect on the
Movement's seeming disappearance.
So does the fact that this month we re-inaugurate
Ronald Reagan as President. A classical dramatist could
not have ordered things more neatly. It's truly astounding: Twenty years ago Berkeley administrators crack
down on fundraising at Sather Gate by CORE, the militant Congress Of Racial Equality. This launches FSM.
FSM's success arouses public anxiety, which in turn
helps launch Ronald Reagan. Reagan brings with him,
as a key strategist, an assistant D.A. named Edwin
Meese, who some credit with the clumsy order to send
in the cops at Berkeley. Later, Meese expresses the opinion that some demonstrators "deserve to die," and after
Kent State Reagan himself endorses the idea of a "bloodbath" to end student protest.
Today, this same Reagan is backed for re-election by
leaders of CORE. He puts forward Edwin Meese to become U.S. Attorney General. And he wins a reported
59 per cent margin of the "youth vote." Sorry, this plot
is just too preposterous.
Unlike theatre, history doesn't quit when the story

Jeff Smith, a graduate of Valparaiso University, is currently
studying film and cultural history at the British Fdm Institute
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The Cresset, "Dark Truths: Prophecy, Ethics, and the Nuclear Peril," appeared last October.
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comes full-circle. The symmetry of events merely raises
further issues. Fifteen years ago, sensible observers
thought the world was coming apart. James Michener
feared a "twilight age" that would see the permanent
mass closing of universities (hundreds did close temporarily after Kent State). He warned of thought-policing and the gradual breakdown of society. And Paul
Goodman, though a mentor to the young, saw a "religious crisis" comparable to the sixteenth-century
Protestant revolt. Consciousness itself was hanging in
the balance. The sensationalist, sky-is-falling view of
events one normally expects from the Sunday supplements had become intellectually reputable. Yet this
most recent election saw the major parties squabbling
over who cared more for traditional values. Leave aside
that this itself may have been an anti-Sixties reaction;
it is hardly what people were predicting back around
1970. Whatever happened to politics in the meantime
is the unanswered question of contemporary American
history, and it is in danger of being left to the Lifestyle
editors at Time magazine.
The question deserves better, and not just historically
speaking. The vitality, even dominance, of that era's
issues today, and the obvious confusion of their various
spokesmen, make dealing with the question an urgent
political task as well.
II

In 1982 I offered a course on "youth in the Sixties" at
the University of Illinois at Chicago. Actually the course
was Advanced Composition. But the idea was to weave
the instruction in writing around a topic that would provide suitable occasions for the various textbook tasks
(from Charles Bazerman's The Informed Wn"ter)-Summaries and Paraphrases, Essays of Response, Essays
Analyzing Purpose and Tech nique, Syntheses of Multiple Sources, and, finally, the R esearch Paper.
Now, at the time I wasn't a whole lot older than my
students, but it was clear that even minor "generation
gaps" were quickly becoming significant. Memories
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were fading fast. (On an informal pre-test, only one student correctly identified SDS, although about ten out
of twenty-five knew roughly what "Kent State" meant.)
Also, I was philosophically wondering how "Advanced
Composition," my interim life's work, mattered in the
world aside from grades and jobs. I gathered that this
was a Sixties sort of question. Certainly that era had
focused attention on universities, and some of the participants have claimed that what they did in those days
was all deeply educational. Well, I was paid to educate.
If my students wouldn't experience the thing for themselves, then I'd darn well have to make it an assignment.

Landon Jones argues that because of
the baby boom, there were millions of
extra teenagers in the Sixties. The
world was not prepared for them and
some were crowded out, and that
was all their "alienation" was. It
was simply a demographic blip.
We moved more quickly through the writing assignments than we did through the Sixties. The Synthesis
of Multiple Sources brought us only as far as the Free
Speech Movement. FSM made a good case study for
this task because it was both a prototype and a source of
later events, and hence a key to the whole, larger "Movement." Also, it's fairly easy to separate the "descriptive"
issues FSM raises-what happened and why- from evaluative issues, like who's to blame and what should be
done about it.
Berkeley offers no single occurrence as deeply troubling, or as they used to say, "heavy," as, for instance,
Kent State's. A very interesting recent book on Kent
State, Scott L. Bills' Kent State/ May 4: Echoes Through a
Decade (Kent State Press), makes clear that the problems
of assessing and memorializing the shootings there have
never ceased to preoccupy that campus. As Bills' title
suggests, "May 4" (the shootings as remembered later,
through eulogies, lawsuits, and candlelight vigils) has
become equally as important and resonant a term for
that community as "Kent State" itself (the shootings as
they occurred). "Kent State" can no longer be viewed
unobstructed.
By contrast, FSM was a time, in the words of Milton
Viorst, of "openness, innocence, and love," when "the
movement seemed genuinely to be a confrontation between beauty and blemish, ideals and compromise,
purity and hypocrisy." This may exaggerate, but it is
true that even FSM's harshest critics-like Ayn Rand,
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whose hysterical rantings about those "grotesque little
monstrosities" (students) served almost as a catalogue
of formal fallacies in logic-usually concede that FSM
had legitimate complaints. So in class we left aside evaluative problems and stuck to critiquing and comparing
the various available sources-news accounts, official
statements, sociological analyses, speeches, memoirs,
and supposedly "objective" histories.
In short order we faced the horrific, or maybe just
horrible, Research Paper, but it's fair to say the foundations were there. The sources and explanations around
FSM are a cross-section of sources and theories of the
whole era. To suggest the range of these theories of what
events were "about" and what brought them on, I gave
students bits of Paul Goodman's New Reformation (1969),
and Landon Y. Jones' Great Expectations: Amen·ca and
the Baby Boom Generation (1980). Goodman's essay is the
one that speaks of a "religious crisis" and of a new Protestantism, brought on by young people's basic loss of
faith in "the nature of things." ("Alienation," that Sixties
byword, is, Goodman notes, "a Lutheran concept.")
For its time, Goodman's interpretation is even a bit conservative. Other writers back then compared radical
youth not to Protestants but to the early Christians at
the fall of Rome. And at least one bestselling account,
Charles Reich's The Greening of America, foresaw an
imminent, thoroughgoing transformation of human
consc10usness.
Near the other extreme, Landon Jones makes fun of
the fall-of-Rome idea. In his view, the attitudes Goodman described were just what some might call a "demographic blip." Because of the Baby Boom, there were
millions of extra teenagers in the Sixties. The "world
was not prepared for them" and some were crowded
out, and that was all their "alienation" was. According
to Jones, the sheer unprecedented size of the postwar
"birth cohort" meant that strange things were bound to
happen in the Sixties.

III
It is obvious how Jones' theory depends on its perspective in time. "We now know that the New Man never
really arrived. He just got older.'" Without ten postMovement years to study, Jones could never be this
smug. In class I pointed to this to suggest that the contents of theories, the actual explanations they offer of
events, are bound up not only with their styles, methods,
and terminologies but also with when they were written. Jones' theory is logical to 1980 in the same way that
Goodman's is logical to 1969, when turmoil was still all
around. In fact, with events like the Movement, it seems
as though as time passes the theories tend to become less
sweeping. Events have a tendency to shrink from spiritThe Cresset

ual crises to statistics.
That's not always true, of course, but it does suggest
ordering the theories that follow according to the scope
and significance they ascribe to events. I'm using
"theory" here to mean any coherent explanation, from
a few remarks to a three-volume academic study with
footnotes. This makes exact comparisons impossible.
It's also true that any given explanation might combine
elements of several theories; that I am leaving out many
theorists and doing justice to none; and that within any
theoretical "school" one might find different writers
drawing opposite conclusions or taking opposite sides
politically. Finally, there is the problem of making that
separation I mentioned between descriptive accounts
and value judgments. Leaving that for later, here is my
working catalogue, or "typology," of theories of the
Sixties Movement:
Theologt"cal theories. This group includes Goodman,
Charles Reich, and whoever else saw events as involving
young people's deepest spiritual concerns. Religious
terminology often figures in. The Movement has been
described as a "new Transcendentalism," and indeed,
these theories often focus on the "transcendent" experiences, including drug use and mysticism, associated
with the "counterculture."
Theological theories tend to be more popular with
defenders of the Movement than with its critics, for the
obvious reason that most critics dismiss the idea that
the Movement was deeply motivated or significant (a
task that has grown easier in recent years). Nonetheless,
Goodman's remarks indicate that these theories can be
brought to bear by worried observers as well as enthusiastic ones.
Depth psychology. Theological theories shade over
into these. Kenneth Keniston's books are prominent
here, but there are many other writers who have tried
out ideas involving huge, collective "identity crises" or
"Oedipal conflicts." Factors are pointed to that characterize the whole generation at once: "permissive"
childrearing, modern education, the advent of the atom
bomb. TV is commonly cited, whether for encouraging
a belief in "instant gratification" or for putting forward
images and stereotypes that young people unconsciously
rebelled against or played out. In all cases, these theories argue that "the problem" goes to the heart of the
personalities of those being studied. Hence, these theories are almost always more worried than enthusiastic.
At their extreme, in fact, they see in youthful protest a
"mass neurosis" or a breakdown of basic values.
Intellectual movements. This complicated theory
grows out of ideas about what literary and art critics call
"modernism." The basic thesis is that Sixties youth collectively expressed an intellectual urge logical for that
time in history, just as Cubist painting was a logical hisJanuary, 1985

torical step beyond Impressionist painting. Youth unrest, in fact , was a kind of living art form. And like
Cubist painting, it was an art form with a fundamental,
"modernistic" new twist, one that questioned the whole
distinction between art, thought, and the "real world."
This type of theory is sweeping but still quite recent.
It appears in Marshall Berman's 1982 book, All That Is
Sol£d Melts Into At"r, and in an essay by Fredric Jameson,
"Periodizing the Sixties." Jameson's essay is the cornerstone of a rather defensively titled book, The S£xt£es
W£thout Apology, a significant collection of retrospective
essays recently published by the University of Minnesota. Jameson speaks of "philosophy" rather than art,
but still sees the Movement as a particular stage in the
history of that activity. What distinguishes this view
from depth psychology is the belief that the collective
urges of the period were not "caused" from the outside
(whether by toilet training or TV), but rather arose from
some internal logic of art or thought as they unfolded
through time. "Thought" causes action instead of actions
creating attitudes.
Tradt"tional ht"story. A far less complex business.
There are many different styles of this, but what they
have in common is that they see no great unfolding. Instead, they see history constantly being nudged along
by the actions of particular people, who in turn adjust
their actions to each new event. Thus specific facts like
the draft lottery or an economic downturn figure into
explanations of this kind. Ronald Inglehart of the University of Michigan has explained the fading of the
Movement in terms of "basic values" interacting with
"period" or "short-term" effects. Such an approach obviously lends itself to looking back over spans of time.
In class we looked at Irwin Unger's historical book The
Movement. From his 1974 vantage point, Unger described the early Movement with an eye to its internal
problems and contradictions, problems which were
"not obvious" then but would later, he claims, cause the
Movement to disintegrate.
Soct"ology and superficial psychology. Another catch-all
for a large group of approaches of varying complexity.
(Sociology was very popular in the Sixties.) Generally,
sociologists concern themselves less with the way events
interact with events-the historian's concern-than with
the way groups of people interact. Relationships among
the groups are stressed rather than, as in depth psychology, the personalities of the individuals who comprise
a given group. The languages of economics, of social
backgrounds as "determinants of behavior," and of
Marxist-style class analysis are common in descriptions
of these relationships. Sociologists try to draw conclusions from measurable facts about their groups, though
these "facts" can be as general as, "Activists arise from
a politically isolated professional-managerial class
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base," or as specific as, "40 per cent of students who sat-in
at Sproul Hall read My Weekly Reader in the third
grade."
Superficial or "applied" psychology resembles sociology in being less concerned with the core of personality than with the "dynamics" at work within and
between groups. This is the sort of psychology an efficiency expert might apply to your office. The Berkeley
administration, for example, might be criticized in its
handling of FSM for having violated sound management practices or the precepts established by "organization theory ." Of course this is not a moral criticism,
and in fact the social sciences have often been vilified
for trying (hypocritically, say some) to remain "valuefree."
Rational-response theories. A special type of superficial psychology, extremely common because it is almost the absence of a theory. It flips around the "mass
neurosis" view of people's behavior and argues that
people did what they did because the facts called for
exactly those responses. Hal Draper's Berkeley: The
New Student Revolt is an eyewitness account of FSM.
It treats students as fellow eyewitnesses, and so stresses
the dramatic moments of confrontation, sometimes
occurring almost literally "on stage," at which participants saw the truth and drew the appropriate conclusions. By the same token , Draper is harsh with administrators, whose "lofty" and "abstract" affirmations of
principle he assumes to be unreal and hypocritical by
comparison to their actual behavior and their grubby
interests. But even this harshness credits the administrators with handling things rationally, from their point
of view.
More commonly, only one side is seen as behaving
rationally. "Hey, white students were simply moved by
common decency to fight for civil rights." (Though this
doesn't explain why the decency appeared precisely
when it did .) Or: "Hey, of course the Guardsmen fired,
their lives were in danger." Since rational-response
views are characteristic of those defending one side or
the other, their popularity waxes and wanes with the
political popularity of the various sides. But lots of
theories contain some element of rational-response
thinking.
Superficial sociology. Here we find Landon Jones'
demographics; polling by folks like Gallup and Yankelovich (though this is often not so much theorizing as
collecting data); and a book called The Woodstock Census, which surveys today's "Yuppies" about the doings
of their formative years. The bias here is toward interpretations which, as in rational-response, stress the role
of conscious (and shifting) opinions, since these are the
kind that can be expressed in polls. Or if not opinions,
then measurable and quantifiable facts of some kind,
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like an individual's average income or amount of laundry soap purchased last year.
Conspiracy theories. Simplest of all. What accounts
for events is someone's secret decision to cause them.
The Movement was a Communist plot; the Movement
collapsed on the strength of FBI "counter-revolution"
(a point taken up by Sol Yurick in The Sixties Without
Apology). More subtly, the media were manipulated, or
let themselves more or less unconsciously play along
with one side.
Again, this is "theory" in only the most limited sense,
though not therefore wrong. There is a slightly more
complex variant, put to me by one ex-radical: the "Telex" theory. "You have to realize that these student newspapers at Berkeley and Michigan and so forth were all
hooked together by Telex," he said. "All these people
communicating with each other, that was the Movement." And no doubt those Telexes buzzed when the
news broke that the National Student Association was
controlled by the CIA.
IV
Behind these theories lies a smaller set of still more
general notions of how history works. Theological, intellectual-movement, and some historical theories imply
that history is progressive, that it is following some
grand pattern toward an ever different future. (Whether
history was, or should be, progressing was itself a political issue in the Sixties.) Other historical and sociological theories imply that history is cyclical. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. has argued that we are in for another Sixtiesstyle era of "public action" when the generation of leaders reared in the Sixties comes to power. Remaining
theories tend to suggest that history is accidental or
random, either following no pattern or following only
smaller, "local" ones. To come to a better understanding
of the Sixties might mean to get an insight into this
grand question of the nature of history. Yet this is not
what preoccupies people. We fret more over the simpler
and more emotionally charged question of whether to
be worried by the whole thing. (Leave aside the fact that
if history is following some grand, unalterable course,
then there is no point in worrying.)
I left my students with the reflection that any effort
to explain "what happened" to the Sixties presupposes
a comparison between then and now. And comparisons,
for better or worse, usually imply value judgments.
More often than not, this judgment will be in favor of
the Sixties. You can't say something "happened" to the
Sixties unless that era was some distinct thing. And to
be distinct is to be special, even meaningful. There are
rare exceptions, like Landon Jones' argument that being
different numerically was itself the Sixties only distincThe Cresset
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tion. But generally writers who ask what happened
implicitly prefer the distinctiveness and meaningfulness
they see then to the seeming incoherence of now.
There is an extreme version of this preference, which
I did not mention to the students even though I was
watching them for evidence of its truth. It is a view
summed up by a recent Miami News editorial cartoon.
Two old men are sitting on a park bench, and each Js
reading a newspaper:
First Man : "According to this study. many young people today
have no sense of historical perspective. are poorly informed . read
very little of anything. are self-indu lgent. materialistic. and passion·
ate ly money-hungry ."
Second Man: " It says here that a lot of young people are voting
Repu blican."

Of course, the point is that there is some connection
between the cultural or sociological facts about young
people and their political preferences: Ignorance and
selfishness have a specific political content. As SAT
scores drop, the youth vote for Reagan rises. At its extreme, the fear is of "a political, ideological dark age,"
as one old radical recently put it. (Louis Malle's film
My Dinner with Andre also speaks of a post-Sixties "dark
age," and social critic Christopher Lasch has used the
term "spread of stupefaction.") Friends of mine in academia have called this supposed historical development "the Endarkenment," a term designed to suggest
the opposite of enlightenment. The idea carries special
emotional weight for academics who, like Bruce Bawer
of SUNY-Stony Brook, find that their college students
routinely confuse Lincoln and Washington, or, as I
found, don't know the difference between nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants. These academics make a
fearful alliance with those who remain on the Left, since
both groups, teachers and social progressives, have reason to worry that their efforts may increasingly be futile.
Young people, they fear, are not just lowering their
sights, but gradually going blind.
Endarkenment isn't a theory but a value judgment.
If it is occurring there could be theories to explain it
(perhaps involving regressive rather than progressive
schemes of history), but likewise there are arguments
that deny it altogether. Some of these, however, are not
so very reassuring. For instance, one might argue that
certain "elites" have not changed much in their views.
Sure, students at Boston College voted two-to-one for
Reagan, but students at nearby Harvard voted two-toone for Mondale. The problem is that this answer suggests a widening split between social and intellectual
classes in America, a split almost as worrisome as Endarkenment itself.
Or one could go the other way and say, sure, college
students are dumber today, but that doesn't indict our
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whole culture, just the colleges. The problem with this
is that a decline of higher education is itself a formula
for a new dark age.
But the most fundamental reply to prophets of Endarkenment is one that a conservative professor of mine
offered. Sure, things were different then, he said, but
that doesn't mean they were any more intelligent. Ignorance does not run one particular way politically. Sixties
students were just as simple-minded as those today ,
even if their slogan was "Off the pigs" instead of whatever we're hearing now: "Nuke Iran" or, as in the comic
strip Bloom County, "I [heart] Dough$$."

v
Of course, this argument misses an inherent difference between conservative and radical views. In and of
themselves, nonconformist opinions are necessarily selfconscious in a way that adherence to prevailing institutions and views needn't be. Unlike "Bomb the Russians ,"
which one 18-year-old recently described as her generation's basic political axiom, "Off the pigs" (translation:
Kill the police) scandalizes prevailing opinion . Saying
it requires an awareness of social norms, and a deliberate flouting of them, just as saying "male nurse" requires
momentary awareness that most nurses, but not this
one, are women. (Linguists call this phenomenon
"marking.") Beyond this, though, Sixties students had
more to offer than this idiotic slogan. Re-read their
literature with today's students in mind. "Industrialization and war have created a tightly-planned corporate complex that dominates the economy." "The 'futures' and 'careers' for which American students now
prepare are for the most part intellectual and moral
wastelands." "Every individual is responsible to a higher authority than the government." "The multiversity
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inculcates the values of the acquisitive society." "This
concept of what America is conflicts with what I am." A
thousand propositions like these, and millions of words
elaborating on them, were at one time commonplaces
on campus. They are staggeringly more critical of established ways of thinking than anything most of today's
students could imagine. It's not that today's students
deny the "corporate complex" or the "acquisitive society"; it's that they're not aware such ideas could even
exist.
It is pointless to say these ideas spread merely because radicalism was "the thing to do." We all adopt our
points of view in some social context that supports them.
Sixties students had to know that even if their close
friends agreed, parents and the state distinctly didn't.
It is clear from the spate of "youth memoirs" published
back then that for a time, a young person's coming to
political awareness was a dramatic event fraught with
risk-taking and conflict.
By many accounts, this intellectual as well as physical
risk-taking is what made it all such an educational experience. Here is what a lawyer might call a "prima facie"
case for the value of protest. I know someone is going
to throw the brownshirts at me at this point, so let's
specify that we mean nonviolent activism not promoted
by the state (since that would take away the "marked"
quality). Let us join in deploring violence on all sides,
the Weathermen's as well as the state's at home and
abroad. That said, I cannot believe that "unreflective
protest" was the problem that has been claimed, since
obviously a great deal of energy was spent on thinking.
From the evidence of a documentary film called "The
Frustrated Campus," which I showed in class because it
had been made at U. of I., impassioned discussion didn't
just lead to Movement policy but was an integral part
of it. From FSM leader Mario Savio to Nancy Anderson
in The Sixties Without Apology today, activists argued
that "the Establishment" believed "history had ended,"
and that the Movement, in response, had to establish the
basic right to continue debating fundamental issues and
addressing unsolved problems. Liberal education had
been trying to get them to assert that right for ages.
Sixties students also rejected the notion that as a privileged elite they had no cause to complain. They have
been ridiculed for accepting the idea of "student as
nigger," the affluent as oppressed. Yet this was, simply,
the key to all that energetic thinking, partly because it
brought social problems home to them, but mainly because it implied that "the System" was false at its core.
As Professor R.P. Wolff said at Columbia in 1969,
"When the priests rebel, then it is almost certainly the
Church itself which is at fault." If even the privileged
suffer (by fault of their bureaucratic, money-oriented,
"punchcard" way of life), then what is needed is nothing
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less than cultural renewal- the counter-culture, feminism, new modes of work, a whole new politics.
When the autobiographical fact of being a middleclass youth at college became itself grist for analysis,
vast new perspectives were opened up that never occur
to students today. Political theory seemed to throw
light on sexuality, sexuality on politics, spirituality on
political liberation, liberation on personal growth, personal growth on sexuality, and on and on. One could
catalogue the proliferation of ideas around any key
Sixties term, like "oppression," the way archeologists
catalogue ancient ideas attached to cuneiform markings
for "goat." (A "Lexicon of Folk-Etymology" in The Sixties Without Apology tries to do just such a Sixties catalogue.) The Movement has been accused of ideological
"exhaustion," but if this is true it is in the sense not of
running out of ideas but of getting tired from handling
the glut. Pick up Mitchell Goodman's 1970 compendium, The Movement Toward a New America. I don't
mean read it, just pick it up. See if that isn't exhausting
enough. The book is a Yellow Pages of undigested
thinking, and the whole era, as professors in the humanities well know, was a Renaissance-like frenzy of insights
which the leading edges of several disciplines are still
trying to scoop up.
Now, I'm told that my alma mater, Valparaiso University, managed the glut of ideas in the Sixties through a
program called "Week of Challenge." And I can affirm
that the idea of packing 'em in for a week of speeches
and debates would have been pure comedy in my era
(the late Seventies). I guess it's commendable that proposals were made to revive the Week anyway. But such
proposals also betray the self-conscious tribute paid by
today's students to nostalgic inklings of the Sixties, the
era that still structures students' sense of themselves
politically.
This raises a serious question. Recently at Illinois
State and earlier at Valparaiso, riot police moving in
on fraternity beer blasts and "drink-ins" were taunted
by cries of "Kent State! Kent State!" Newsweek on Campus
may call this simply "the well-known tendency of history to repeat itself as farce." But to me it's the tendency
that makes it imperative to figure out "what happened"
to the Sixties.
The troubling prospect is that ideas are somehow not
well institutionalized in our culture. "Slogans" are often
criticized as ideas gone rigid, but in another sense they
are ideas that are still available, still responsive to
events. "Student as nigger" and "woman as nigger"
once expressed quickly recognized concepts, not universally agreed to but unreservedly admitted in debate.
Just a few years later, when a muckraking campus editor (me) revived "woman as nigger" to critique fraternity harassment of women, Black students set upon him
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for putting "that word" into print, despite its manifest
pro-minority intention . Once-standard views introduced out of the Sixties context become themselves the
targets of an activist mentality that's flying on autopilot,
and with garbled memory tapes. To switch metaphors,
the wheels so thoroughly came off that era's ideological
cart that it's dangerous now to reinvent one.
In the Sixties some conservatives feared a new dark
age on the grounds that the "social fabric" was ripping
apart. Leaving aside a few urban ghettos, we can now
see that the social fabric wasn't nearly that fragile. In
our country at least, the real danger is that ideas may
just fall out of history. Good friars someplace may go
on copying the words, as during the first Dark Age, but
the culture loses its ability to make use of them.
VI
What disturbs me is not the political choices young
people may make, but the possibility that many of them
aren't making any at all. At Brown University, students
want the health clinic to pass out suicide pills when
(not if) nuclear war breaks out. (The adult health-clinic
director opposes this, not because it's an insipid nonresponse to the war issue-he agrees the war is comingbut because he thinks it's our duty to ride things out in
our fallout shelters.) The password for students today
is, indeed, "cynicism," but not in the narrow, moneygrubbing sense. The real cynicism is the worldview that
says "they" will go on giving us pretty much what we've
come to expect, and that since this is so, maybe it's actually wrong to resist. "That many people voting for
Reagan can't all be wrong." Or, "Oh, I suppose you
think we ordinary people have as much political influence as those PACs." Resigned attitudes like these
push one's perception of things over into moral evaluation of them: The seeming solidity of what is is permitted
to determine what should be. I've heard this called "having faith in history" (something Sixties folk allegedly
didn't do), but it's more like faith in that shadowy "they,"
and far more "unreflective" than protest has ever been.
Students of varying political inclinations today instinctively agree about "the managed society," except that
for them this phrase describes reality, where for Sixties
radicals it was something to oppose, a rallying cry. If
those radicals sometimes energetically overestimated
what they would be able to accomplish, is this worse than
seeing young people vote for suicide pills?
Some of those who have given up on today's students
turn to the aging Sixties generation for political hope.
The debate over "what happened" to these people rages
on. Let me just clarify its underlying historical question :
Once past the "formative years," do people basically
shape their times, or do the times and the stages of life
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reshape people? Which trend dominates? We're back to
needing a theory. Sadly, I don't have one. (In fact, when
I read that the U.S. dropped more than 500 pounds of
explosives per person on North and South Vietnam in
pre-1970 air assaults alone, I find myself leaning toward
the rational-response view of the Movement.) Nevertheless, I can suggest good places to look: at Sather Gate
and on Blanket Hill. The Movement spoke of remaking
the world, but it began and ended as a struggle over
those tiny plots of land. In the meantime there was People's Park, Morningside Park, Grant Park, and numerous streets, sidewalks, and administration buildings.
Partly these struggles were fought over the issue of
public territory versus private-it's no accident that
both Berkeley and Kent State were state institutionsand this may be the great issue the period has handed
down to us today.

Back then it wasn't just a question
of the government's role in things.
It was a deeper question of who
"owned" the institution, activity, or
turf, or even the events themselves.
But back then it wasn't just a question of the government's role in things. It wa a deeper sort of question of
who "owned," politically or militarily or, finally , ceremonially, the institution, activity, or turf; or, as at Kent
State (as Scott Bills shows), who "owned" the events themselves. "Alienation" clearly was bound up with this
sense of ownership, or lack thereof. So was the quest for
intense and unconventional experience, which you
sought because it could be more fully "your own." Even
Vietnam figures in: Both the practical and the moral
objections to the war are encompassed by the feeling
that Americans didn't "belong" there. The editors of
The Sixties Without Apology hint at these issues of ownership and "space" and suggest that they are a typical
"late capitalist" development. Whatever the case, they
appear to be part of what made the personal political,
and of what undercut the faith of young people in tradition, "the System," and anyone over thirty.
Full development of this perspective awaits another
essay; this is just meant to suggest the terrain, as it were.
At the start of Advanced Composition I had students
summarize a news report on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington. Inevitably, one student converted the phrase "hallowed ground" to "hollow
ground." I ma:cked the error and hoped this ignorance
wasn't typical. But now I think the student may have
unwittingly pointed toward truth.
Cl
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James D. Black

ON BEING A GOOD TEACHER
Second Thoughts on Some Neo-Romantic Notions

Before we know it, classes wi ll be drawing to a close.
When June comes, I wi ll clear out my desk, turn in my
room key, and go home to face my annual summer bout
of post parium depression. Another group of seniors will
have graduated, and I'll not have a "next year" with
them, unless I have succeeded into putting something
into their minds, hearts, and souls which will still be
there next year.
That's my goal: to give them something that they will
still have next year-and the year after, and all the years
after.
Am I doing my job? Am I a good teacher? I ask my
students to define a good teacher, not a good English
teacher or math teacher, just a "good teacher." They
answer almost unanimously, "Someone who knows his
subject and enjoys teaching it."
How simple. And how surprising-how unlike what
I was told in college and graduate school. I was never
told that I should know what I was teaching. Summerhat
and open schools, Up the Down Staircase, John Holt,
Jonathan Kozol, and anti-establishment-these neoRomantic books and writers and attitudes were the rage
in the Sixties and early Seventies when I was a student.
The strongest advice I ever received came in the form
of two cliches, delivered frequently and with great conviction: "Love your students-if you love your students,
everything else will be all right." And "You don't teach
English-you teach kids." This advice hasn't been very
helpful. My students don't even rate "loving your students" very highly. You say, "But you have seniors.
They don't need the cuddling a first-grader needs."
You're right. They are mature enough to feel an academic need rather than a purely emotional one. They
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want to learn something, and they know that they can
learn it better if I know my subject and am enthusiastic
about it. Their classmates will supply the buddies and
the love.
I ask my students if there are other qualities which
they think a good teacher should have, and they tell
me, "Yes, a good teacher shouldn't lie or be a fake."
Again , I think back to my own student days and to one
of the catch-phrases of the era, "crap detector." What
about me? Do my students detect crap in me? I hope not.

I ask my students to define a good
teacher, not a good English teacher
or math teacher, just a good teacher.
They say, "Someone who knows his
stuff and enjoys teaching it."
"Oddity," perhaps, or "Difference," for I like tweed
suits and tie-your-own bow ties; I hate MacDonald's
hamburgers and New Wave music; even more foreign
to my students, I love colonial dancing. But I decide
I'm not crap. Crap is advocating ERA when I'm against
it. Crap is finding a redeeming social value in Three's
Company. Crap is trying to be a jive soul brother when
I'm white and forty-one. Crap is giving my approval to
values and behavior of which I disapprove, or affecting
to like what I do not.
Eventually a few students will ask me how I became
interested in colonial dancing. One, perhaps two, will
want to learn how to do the minuet. The others? At best
I will hear some say, "Mr. Black? He knows some stuff
about colonial dancing! Why, he even goes to balls in
Williamsburg!" That is a victory, not for colonial dancing nor for me, but for those students who have learned
to accept me as I am. That is a big step toward their own
self-acceptance and honesty of feeling and self-expression. They don't have to have me act or think their way
to affirm their own sense of rightness.
My students are quiet now. They have no more sugThe Cresset

gestions about what makes a good teacher. I think of
other characteristics which I value and silently I name
them. Silently, because I think they should be lived,
not lectured.
I think about service. I am a Scouter and a Rotarian.
My students know this and occasipnally ask me about
outings and projects, and how I find time to do community work when school keeps me so busy. I tell them
-briefly, quietly-that time is precious to me, too, but
that time spent in the service of others is never wasted.
I frequently chaperone sockhops, sell tickets at games,
sponsor clubs and classes, serve on committees. Students notice, and they know I do these things for them
and for the betterment of the school, not for personal
gain.
I think about responsibility and duty and virtue and
nobility of character. I hope my students see these traits
in me to whatever degree I have managed to cultivate
them. I hope that they remember them, even if less
vividly than they will remember my bow ties.
When I read back over this, I feel almost ashamed that
I have treated "love" so casually. I do grow to love many
of my students- but some just aren't lovable. I hope
some grow to love me- but I'm not lovable to everyone.
Again my memory stirs and I recall the neo-Romantics
and their concept of "love"- "Walk into the classroom
and tell your students that you love them." And where
do you go from there? What's left? What do you call it
when feelings grow and deepen, if you begin by calling
an accidental, computer-arranged relationship "love"?
Pre-mature, that's what it is. And shallow-as shallow
as a Hollywood agent calling everyone "sweetheart"as shallow as ninth-graders calling everyone "friend"
without making the proper distinction between "acquaintance" and "friend."
'
I do hope that my students approve of me, but I don't
need their approval. As a teacher I must admit that
approval builds rapport, that I can teach them better if
I do have their approval. What I mean is that as a person
I don't need their approval. A teacher who deliberately
courts student approval because of his own immaturity
and insecurity shouldn't be in teaching. He shouldn't
need their help to grow up. To grow, yes, but not to
grow up.
Well, June will soon be here, and soon they will be
gone: to work, to college, to the Armed Forces, to a
hundred roles, to lead a hundred lives and found a
hundred families. Will I be a part of them next year,
and the year after, and all the years after? I haven't
answered my own question: Am I a good teacher? It
sounds more as if I'm trying to find out if I am a good
person.
And perhaps that is the answer I should look for .

Their Highnesses

When wind the size of Michigan
shrieks over Oak Street Beach and
catapults steel barricades with
white demonic ecstasy to paste us
'gainst The Mile's shopfronts sideways,
he's pressing blues with matching lips
along the silver length of it, and only
stops to shake it dry and check the box
when traffic's gone with green
west up Division.
A regular stick figure here in
every kind of weather, or end of
bridge at Wacker, or further down
by Field's, fingering his one possession
hungrily, sleeves too short and collar
torn on what Salvation Army gifted him.
Tonight I need my change and
think to join the passing blind
immune to giving in this rain which
in an hour or less will surely turn
to ice.
He's just completing "Bess" and
I'm about abreast, not proud with my
decision-when one steps from the flood
to bend, oh, almost regally, and drops
as soundlessly as prayer what appears
a dollar.
One wouldn't notice her another time.
Another Bag Lady you'd say, roped
casually into an overcoat too roomy,
too moth-holed to keep the body warm.
But it's her feet impresses me, all bare
but for the rags wrapped 'round and 'round
imperiously.
How now will she eat? Where sleep? What
music hear until tomorrow when they
hit the streets together?
Or is it all
an act designed to rob from us more than
our quarters?

Lois Reiner
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January, 1985

21

Her Feminist
Fundamentalism
Richard Lee
She was more angry than I think
she knew. She was certainly opposed
to the doctrine of the virgin birth
and she objected to its slightest implication in our class discussion of
Macbeth. Actually, I had only tried to
illumine the "bewitching" metaphors in the incantation soliloquy
of Lady Macbeth by contrasting
them with the "blessing" metaphors
in the incarnation song of Mary
when I dismally discovered I had
to teach the apparently lesser known
Magmficat at greater length than the
soliloquy I had hoped to clarify. It
was, of course, pedagogical quicksand. I had "stepped in so far" into
the Magnificat that returning to Macbeth became "as tedious as go o'er,"
and the class ended with her invincible inference that the discussion
was about the virgin birth. Nice
going, teach.
After class, therefore, I invited her
to join her issue with me in my
study. It soon appeared I was only
the most recent representative of
the campus patriarchy (bachelor
father sect) to put women down
with the "Western Tradition," and
I had to admit the Bible and Shakespeare were a considerable part of it.
The nub of her objection to the doctrine of the virgin birth was that it
celebrated female passivity and endlessly praised women for bending
their wills to "bear" what only males
"create." Since I, like Auden, had
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thought the doctrine celebrated
male and female passivity only
when God creates, I was as curious
to hear her out as I was eager to
ease her anger with me, Shakespeare, Saint Luke-and possibly
herself.
Next, as it happened, I was present to her biblical fundamentalism
cracking up upon her feminism.
Now the breakdown of any student's
fundamentalism for whatever reason is never easy for a student or
her teachers. At bottom, the student
fighting for a faithful wi-ly out of
fundamentalism thinks she has long
been lied to, and almost every teacher is now suspect. In minutes, however, she discerned I had no male
vested interest in the doctrine of
the virgin birth, and I think we were
able to explore her objection to it in
a sisterly fashion in which she could
think for herself. Neither of us being
rationalists, we shared no objection
to the miraculous in the doctrine;
both of us being faithful, we assumed
there was a good word for both men
and women in it somewhere.
We first agreed it was a pesky doctrine whenever it misplaced the
miraculous into a pagan gynecology
and substituted God for Joseph as
the father of a homunculus Jesus.
We next agreed it was a pernicious
doctrine whenever it denied a faithful understanding of the incarnation
in which "whatever God has not
assumed is not redeemed." (She believed, or hoped to believe, that in
the incarnation God had fully assumed and redeemed the natural
birthing of men and women bearing
the genetic endowment of both their
mothers and fathers. A biology of
males "begetting" what females
only "bear" was her fundamentalist
theology of the virgin birth, and her
feminism opposed that bad biology
and worse theology.) Finally, we
agreed that the mythology the doctrine takes to express God in Jesus
was inexpressive of that mystery for
us, though neither of us were closed

to thinking metaphorically about
divine mysteries if we hoped to
think about them at all.
What remained at issue between
her fundamentalism and her feminism was the question whether biblical faith could counter the denaturing of women she thought the
doctrine of the virgin birth celebrated. Now, my first hunch is that
my fundamentalist students never
need less Bible when their fundamentalism is crashing against what
they can possibly believe. And my
second hunch is what anybody can
possibly believe rests more upon
her biblical imagination than her
good reason, which appropriately
follows her better imagination. So,
still stinging from my pedagogical
danger in our class discussion, I
nevertheless suggested she consider a few metaphors in Jesus' own
teaching of the virgin birth.
To be sure, as a good fundamentalist she knew that the virgin birth
was never a claim Jesus made for
himself, but I suggested it was a
claim Jesus makes upon each of us.
Once, I said, when he was told that
his mother, his brothers, and his
sisters were seeking him while he
was teaching, he replied with the
promise that "whoever does the will
of God is my brother, and sister,
and mother." I offered his metaphors for her imagination and quietly hoped they might move her beyond her feminist fundamentalism.
Perhaps they illumined an incarnating God finding mothers among
his brothers no less than his sisters.
In any event, she brightened at
these wider occasions for her faith,
and she hoped to think about them
on her way to computer class.
I, too, had to ready myself for another class. I probably must teach
those three other witches in Macbeth,
I thought, and I noted Shakespeare
was careful to keep their gender indeterminate. I hoped to be as careful
in our next class discussion . Good
luck, teach.

C:
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The Aesthetic
Of the Awful
Charles Vandersee

Dear Editor:
One unseasonably cold weekend
last fall, here in Dogwood, I paid
two visits to a place I haven't looked
at in years, our Union Station.
This is a brick building of indeterminate age and architecture, sitting where the tracks of the Southern
Railway and the C & 0 cross. It was
once only the Southern station; the
C & 0 station a half mile away, a
columned building of modest grandeur, took care of east-west traffic.
Long unneeded for transport, that
station is soon to become shops,
while the Union Station now unbusily serves both railroads, with an
atmosphere of whisper and decay,
much like the sleepy Custom-House
at Salem, in Hawthorne's Scarlet
Letter.
It was 6:30 on a rainy Friday
morning, still dark, when I went to
meet Mason, the son of old friends
who used to live in Dogwood. The
Union Station parking lot is a desolate stretch of old paving-a vacant
lot bordered by high weeds, with
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large kettle-shaped depressions,
rightly called potholes. Situated
below street level, the lot itself is a
depression, and the depressions in
it were filled with water. I noticed
this, though sleepy, and drove
around them, as if on a gymkhana
course or beginning some sort of
obstacle race. The train had just
come in. There were no painted
lines to go by, so I parked in reference to other vehicles, which were
more or less aligned, as certain old
crooked trees more or less stretch
upward.
By the time I was out of the car
and slowly edging around the potholes, Mason loomed up under the
dim, discoloring light. He trudged
along with one heavy bag, no umbrella or winter coat, looking bedraggled, having (he explained)
walked a few hundred feet in the
rain from where his coach had
stopped. I remembered then that
the shed roof over those several
hundred feet had disappeared years
earlier, decrepit and dangerous beyond repair, I suppose, or else corporate arson.
Mason's mission was to inspect the
University and to match it against
Harvard, Brown, and Wisconsin as
a home for the next four years. His
initial impression of Dogwood was
obviously not cheering, and in fact
both days of his visit were wet and
lowering without remission . Since I
had papers to read and students to
see, Mason wandered about the
grounds of the unfamiliar university, in the mist and drizzle, mostly
by himself, taking in a couple of
classes, visiting the admissions dean,
talking to one of our math professors. He took the guided tour, and
I took him for a drive up on the
Blue Ridge, his parents having told
him about the splendid scenery and
the superb vistas. We saw a great
deal of fog .
Saturday toward dark, after a very
good pizza, we went back to Union
Station, to get Mason on his train to

Alabama. The potholes had dried
somewhat, into threatening mud
slicks, but the parking lot was the
same disorganized incongruity - a
Volvo here and there, marking this
as a university town , the pickup
trucks and old Chevys with bashed
fenders bespeaking a greater d iversity in the population. Mason and
his fami ly had moved to Alabama
only a few weeks earlier, after years
in Pennsylvania, so he had as yet
few impressions of his new region.
He was sure of two things, however:
All the vehicles in Tuscaloosa are
pickup trucks, and in Tuscaloosa
there are no Italian restaurants. I
felt therefore that despite our chilly,
damp weather and the gloomy precincts of Union Station, Dogwood,
with its variety of vehicles and its
satisfying cuisine, had made a favorable impression.

Tuscaloosa has a great
many pickup trucks and
no Italian restaurants.
However, we then entered, across
the crumbling concrete threshold,
the old station bui lding itself. We
looked around, and saw before us
the diversity of the population, represented by about eight people.
There was a jumble of newish airport benches, some old signs pitched
as a fortress in front of the drinking
fountain, a window with an old
table some distance behind it, and
behind the table, almost out of earshot, a station agent. There was one
of those hulking soft drink machines, and there were the walls.
We both noticed the walls at once.
The paint was peeling off all the
walls in curling sheets about the size
of Reader's Digest pages. It was peeling off in so many p laces that the
place looked like a bad movie seta really good movie set would likewise have exceeded reality, but not
by this much. The color of the paint
was the institutional green that one
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st ill sees everywhere-source of one
of the nineteenth-century American
fortunes? Under the green, as Mason
remarked, the white wall was not a
bad color, and we could see a fair
amount of it. But there was enough
of the bad green to produce the institutional murk necessary in stations, and in schools and hospitals,
to subdue hope and courage. If not
a capitalist conspiracy, then a Communist plot to undermine national
spirit.
More or less completing the interior disharmony, complementing
the exterior neglect, was a flimsylooking heating device hung from
one corner of the ceiling. But, curiously, in the windows of the waiting
room none of the panes was broken.
So it was definitely not a movie set.
If they were filming, they would
have broken a few of the panes to go
along with the peeling paint. The
whole place was so impressively awful that we looked instinctively for
those broken panes. How could a
building so bad not have them?
It was the sort of place you expect
to find in gothic regional tales by
Faulkner, Flannery O 'Connor,
Erskine Caldwell, and other connoisseurs of kudzu territory. In this
territory, which I once thought
mythical, massive resistance even
to K-Mart standards of style is a sort
of religious principle. Walking into
Union Station was like walking into
George Hall's barnlike junkyard in
my Indiana hometown, where amid
the old car parts and lopsided furniture was, on the wall, always a tacky
girlie calendar from some screw and
nut company. It was like finding in
a church basement a mildewed box
of old 1940s tracts , hysterically indignant toward Catholics and The
Lodge.
Union Station was so awful it was
terrific; I mean to go again soon.
The Aesthetic of the Awful is now
something I have begun to think
about. Analogies multiply. It was
like reading a truly bad paper from

24

a student who is halfheartedly faking both intelligence and effort, and
also has spilled coffee on the thing.
Or, like any and all American dinner parties and cocktail parties,
where, even if only six people are
present, three separate conversations have to be sustained all evening, at top volume. Decency flags
from the start; only gossip and invective are strong and stalky enough
to survive.
I think about this new aesthetic,
with its conundrum for the critics:
If a thing-a place, an experience,
an event-is this bad, why isn't it
worse? How far would you have to
go to attain the perfection of the
awful? Why, at cocktail parties, don't
people kill each other? (What would
be easier than a lethal dose in a
drink?) Why, at Dogwood Union
Station, weren't there posters, with
misspellings and backward letters,
for faith healings and snake handlings? There was no puddle of vomit
on the floor, as near as I could tellthe winos and the bulimics, where
are they? Why weren't any of those
panes broken or even cracked, not
one?

We are looking not for
the perfectly Awful , but
for its near-perfection.
There is some sort of principle
here, and the thing has puzzled
minds better than mine, one being
our Nobel novelist Saul Bellow. In
Mr. Sammler's Planet, one of the genuinely perfect novels of our time,
New York City is given to us as a
gloomy, depressing place ; Broadway is "fuming, heaving, foolheaped, quivering, stinking . . . a
scene of perversity." A place of despair, fear, and terror, as the passage
goes on-and symbolic of "the soul
of America," not just the mortal
chaos of an overbuilt island. Madness everywhere. But Artur Sam-

mler catches himself in what I seem
to be calling the Aesthetic of the
Awful:
Underneath there persists. powerfully too.
a thick sense of what is normal for hum an
life. Duties are observed. Attachments are
preserved . There is work . People show up
for jobs. It is extraordinary .

That may be the key to the aesthetic right there- the completely
Awful is not what we are looking for.
What we are looking for is not the
perfection of the Awful, but its nearperfection. When we head in the
opposite direction, toward the Excellent, we do want to go as far as we
can, and I am serious in calling Bellow's novel perfect, just as certain
other American novels deserve that
designation: The Sun Also Rises, by
Hemingway, mentioned here not
long ago, and Willa Cather's My
Antonia, both of which have every
word firmly in place and fully
charged to reverberate through the
book, ordering our emotions as well
as our intellect, enlarging us immensely with only a first reading,
and taking us farther with each
rereading.
In short, the perfectly excellent
is just that, but the perfectly Awful

is merely ludicrous.
So we evidently need to sacrifice
the broken panes, the Jesus advertising, and the floorboards of emesis
if we are really to enjoy Union Station. We also have to have, present
on the scene, some little things extraordinarily normal. There are the
Amtrak logos, for example, and the
Amtrak promotional images-train
travel is going to be a neat thing in
your life. All of us are normal
enough to expect in America the
normal egregious promises of commerce (even federally subsidized
commerce), so their slick presence
amid the otherwise dingy makes the
Awful all that more aesthetically
delightful.
Likewise, although the logic of
the cocktail party leads inexorably
The Cresset

to murder, and thus the police, and
perhaps their dirty footprints on
the beige carpet, and any number
of other awful things, the Aesthetic
of the Awful will not tolerate going
this far. Nor will reality. Someone
will, at any party, say some one
thing calmly intelligent. The tiresome know-it-all who not only has
seen all the movies and read all the
reviews, but also can explain how
to dispose of nuclear waste, will suddenly, disarmingly, turn out to like
Irish songs, Welsh choirs, and English ballads. Murder is averted, and
the evening instead of being a perfect horror (which is to say aesthetically a failure) is rescued by incongruity. One relishes the occasion in
retrospect because it has been imperfectly Awful. Why am I now recalling Union Station, if not because
of its unbroken panes?
Truly bad newspapers sometimes
have stunning graphics. Radio on
the AM band, with its insipid Top
Forty and its commercials aimed at
senile citizens, will actually sometimes give the weather report. You
can partly redeem an awful meal by
stopping at Baskin-Robbins for
Chocolate Mousse Royale. Politicians sometimes stop talking, and
cry. Or stop living and die .
Where all this leads, I have not
figured out. Being neither an aesthetician nor a historian of aesthetics, I can't be sure that Kant and
Croce have not preceded me. Or
Lenin, since in spite of everything
in the Soviet Union said to be so
awful, there are still chandeliers in
the subway. I also do not know
whether the Awful is expanding or
slightly diminishing in our timesthe recent election did not settle
that question , although 59 per cent
of the electorate would say that I am
wrong, and the other 41 per cent
would say the same thing.
I do know that Union Station is
probably not going to be the same
awful place for long, since something called a Transportation Cen-
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ter is on the books. This will mean a
refurbishing, and a consolidation
of Trailways and Greyhound in
Union Station, along with Chessie
and the Southern. I incline to think
that various plastics and aluminums
will be employed, and fabrics that
don't breathe, which means that we
are into a whole new mode of the
Awful-in fact, more closely approaching the Perfectly Awful.
In this antiseptic situation the
Aesthetic of the Awful would require the station windows to be

perennially cracked and shattered,
exactly the opposite of the situation
now, which requires that they be
inexplicably whole. I believe I have
this straight. But if Mason enrolls
at the University in Dogwood I wi ll
ask him to find a course that explores the whole thing definitively .
I imagine such a course, complete
with field trips via public transportation, would itself be very nearly
the perfection of the Awful.
From Dogwood, faithfully yours,
C.V.

C:

Faith
Annie L. Carter-she's an old
black lady, whistler's space between her
teeth, frazzled grey at the temple
like ash, alpaca fuzz
under her chin.
Her old man, he's gone; a war vet
with a bum leg. Heart attack took him,
Natural Causes she calls it, and him
more like her daddy than her husband, anyhow.
But she's in love, like a
child, like a smooth-faced celebate.
She talks to Jesus and he answers all right;
not like the children in church-their foreheads
all anointed and shiny-not like a sister from
a phone booth, but she talks and he answers. You got to be
in the world but not of it, walking that
Narrow Way like a peddler going about his business,
keeping ahead. Walk it like a plastic slip-on
from the 5-and-dime, nothing fancy.
Once, a little kid says, "Mizz Carter, you a
bitch," and Annie says
No chile, I ain't no bitch 'cause my mama
she ain't raised no dogs
and off she walks, into that crossroad
jumble of signs, and squints, looking to that road
like a cheshire smile
like the fluid of curtains rising,
like the warmth of wool
on an October night.

Carol Miller
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Review Essay

On Religion
And Politics
Mel Piehl

The

Naked
Public
Square: Religion and
Democracy in America

By Richard John Neuhaus. Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans. 280 pp. $16.95.

The surprising eruption of religion and politics as a central concern of the 1984 presidential campaign has lent new timeliness to
Richard Neuhaus' The Naked Public
Square. Considered in light of the
recent discussion , this book on "religion and democracy in America"
looks stronger in some respects and
weaker in others.
It looks stronger because Neuhaus
knows his way around these treacherous waters, and sails easily around
the rocks and shoals that have caused
so many secular commentators (and
some religious ones) to utter so
much nonsense on this subject. Simply by bringing a high degree of
both religious and political understanding to the question , Neuhaus
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raises the discussion several stories
above the sub-basements where
many newspaper editorialists and
other pundits have put it.
Neuhaus knows, for example, that
religion cannot be "separated" from
politics, and that rigorously secular
views of politics are every bit as religious as "religious" ones. This
ought to be apparent to anyone who
considers the subject for very long,
but the recent campaign commentary demonstrates that even such
simple perspectives are matters of
astonishing ignorance and confusion
not only in the body politic, but in
places like the New York Times Editorial Board.
The Naked Public Square is most
effective in demonstrating the untenability of the view that religion
can be a purely private affair, unrelated to questions of public life. The
fact that many Christians as well as
many secular thinkers have come to
equate religion with purely private
belief, Neuhaus persuasively contends, results from serious misunderstandings of both Christian
faith and political life.
Insofar as it forcefully lays out
such basic groundwork for understanding these issues, The Naked
Public Square is a valuable contribution to the contemporary discussion
of religion and politics. What makes
the book seem weaker, however, is
that at least in some quarters, the
religion-politics question has moved
beyond these essentials onto far
more difficult ground. Once the
low hurdles of "Should religion mix
with politics?" are jumped over, the
really tough obstacles to understanding and prescription begin to
appear. How far must a believing
public official go in implementing
the official teachings of his/ her
church on moral questions? How far
may government, government officials, or political parties go in recognizing the general or particular
claims of religious bodies? How directly should churches be involved

in political activities such as party
voter registrations, issue lobbying,
and candidate endorsements? What
is the difference between laws based
on religion and laws based on religiously based morality?
Such questions are enormously
perplexing, even for people who
agree on the basics concerning religion and politics. The thoughtful
forays into such thickets by Governor Mario Cuomo at Notre Dame
,and Charles Krauthammer in The
New Republic have demonstrated
how sticky such questions are, and
how difficult it is to be both committed and consistent in answering
them. Cuomo and Krauthammer
have by no means settled even one
of these issues, but they at least suggest some of the categories for thinking about them.

Neuhaus knows that
religion cannot be
separated from politics,
and that rigorously
secular views of politics
are just as religious
as "religious" ones.
Anyone who comes to The Naked
Public Square for similar guidance
on such questions will be disappointed. Beyond seeking a stronger
role for religion in public life-and
a recognition of that role from intellectuals and the media-the book is
often frustratingly vague in both its
analysis and prescriptions.
The fundamental problem lies in
the inherent ambiguity of the key
phrase "the public square." Does
this mean all of public social life?
The polity? The state? The beliefs
and statements of public officials?
The law? When considering questions of religion and politics in
America, it is crucial to be precise
about exactly which of these is meant
with reference to each question. Yet
The Ct·esset

The Naked Public Square never adequately develops or maintains such
distinctions, with the result that
many questions are left hanging.
For example, at the heart of the
book's political argument is the
claim that America must return to a
"sacred canopy" of public religion
based explicitly on "the promises
and judgments revealed in the biblical story." This "canopy" is "not
Hinduism or Taoism," or presumably Mormonism or Islam either.
But beyond saying that Christians
must "tolerate" other faiths in America, the content of this prescription
remains unclear. Does it mean legal
recognition of the Judea-Christian
foundations of the state by the Supreme Court? Pronouncements in
favor of Christianity by public officials? A requirement that committed
Hindus or Mormons acknowledge
the J udeo-Christian character of
society before holding office? At
points, the tenor of the argument
leaves open such possibilities, but
there is little examination of the
difficulties that would attend any
such course of official action.
The book also claims that there
has been, until very recently, "one
tradition " that plainly asserted the
central role of Judeo-Christian religion in American "public life." This
assertion rests on a single quote
from Jefferson about the necessity
of maintaining a conviction in the
minds of the public that their liberties are a gift of God. But as Neuhaus implicitly admits in acknowledging Jefferson's lack of orthodoxy,
this hardly settles the matter. The
truth is that the American Founding
Fathers were nearly as confused, divided, and ambivalent about the role
of religion in public life as we ar e.
While they often made general pronouncements asserting the value of
religious belief and practice for the
welfare of the nation , most of them
were extremely wary of allowing
anything but the most marginal
symbolic role for institutional reliJanuary, 1985

gion m the state. It was not some
latter-day secular humanist but
George Washington who refused to
allow even invocations at the opening and closing of the sessions of the
constitutional convention. And
when Benjamin Franklin-himself
no paragon of orthodoxy- moved
that prayers be allowed, the measure
was firmly voted down on the
ground that such actions constituted
too great a "sectarian " intrusion into
the affairs of state.
One may certainly fault such action on all kinds of grounds, as many
Americans did in the nineteenth
century and some do now. But it is
not so easy to contend, as The Naked
Public Square does, that the idea of
state neutrality toward religionand certainly organized religionis a recent secularist invention alien
to American tradition.
The Naked Public Square also rests
its case for restoring religion to the
"public square" too heavily on the
supposed mass popularity of religion . After surveying the bleak secularism of our political and intellectual elites, Neuhaus frequently
turns for hope to the "mill ions of
Americans" who adhere to "traditional religion." He says, "Again,
the democratic reality, even, if you

will , the raw demographic reality,
is that most Americans derive their
values and visions from the biblical
tradition ." Perhaps. But before looking to the people as the source for a
revived religious influence on public life, one might question how
seriously religious, as opposed to
nominally pious, "most Americans"
are. Neuhaus himself suggests that
the strength of the religious "new
right" is not really based on mass
religious belief:
The credibility of the much larger appea l
cla imed by th e religious new right rests
upon its a bi lity to touch nerves of populist
discontent that may have no d irect co nnection with religious belief. That is. millions
of Americans believe that "traditi ona l
values" shou ld be revived a nd are religiously interested on ly to the degree that religion presumably serves such a revival.

From this insight Neuhaus develops an extremely shrewd political analysis of the religious new
right. But he never really raises the
religious objections one might expect to this kind of manipulation of
social values in the name of religion.
Certainly, as Neuhaus says, the
Moral Majority and simi lar groups
have every right to be in politics,
and to promote their values through
the political arena, as much as any
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religious liberal. But acknowledging the legitimacy of religious politics is not the same as deciding if it
is the best way to promote genuine
religious values in public life. To
do that, those actions should be
evaluated by strictly religious criteria, and not according to how
politically successful they are.
Indeed, one might ask from a religious perspective whether the approach taken in The Naked Public
Square does not place an excessive
burden on the polity to guarantee
the central place of religion in the
"public square." If religion is really
strong and vital in a society, then it
will inevitably affect a democratic
polity, and if it is not, the insistence
that the state somehow give greater
official recognition to religion will
not enhance but corrupt religion by
causing it to rely on political instruments. A religion that must rely on
nativity scenes in the courthouse
square to indicate its public strength
is not a very strong religion.

It would seem that a
religion which must
rely on nativity scenes
in the courthouse
square to indicate its
public strength is not
a very strong religion.

Neuhaus is quite critical, rightly
in my opinion, of pietist traditionsincluding elements of Lutheranism
-which tend to make of religion a
purely inward or personal affair,
extending at most to pious conventicles. But the response to this weakness should not be for religionists
to turn to the state as the instrument
to realize their social and moral
values, but rather to demonstrate in
more direct and convincing ways
the social value and importance of
their faith.
«I
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Competency Tests
Reconsidered
Gail McGrew Eifrig
The conference had been fairly
routine until that point. Teachers
and professors stood at lecterns and
delivered papers of varying degrees of usefulness on the general
subject of teaching writing. People
sat and listened politely at the sessions, and at coffee breaks talked
about the weather, or politics, or
movies. Then came a session on the
subject of competency testing and
all hell broke loose.
As defined for this session, competency testing means the process
of objective testing of students in
various subjects with a two-fold result: both the student's progress
through the grades and the teacher's
job security depend on the student's
scores. (On the related issue of the
testing of teacher competency, the
teachers at this conference appeared
uniformly supportive, but then their
presence at the conference identified
them as among the better teachers
in their systems. They have nothing
to fear from the demand to upgrade
the skill levels of teachers.)
Quite obviously, the linking of
student test performance to teacher
salary is bound to raise the interest
and the blood pressure of a teacher.

Gail McGrew Eifrig teaches English at
Valparaiso University and writes regularly on public affairs for The Cresset.

What I did not expect was the degree of attention that the subject of
competency testing immediately
focused on national goals, and the
extent to which citizens respond as
citizens to an educational issue. In
fact, the question of competency
testing is much more than an educational issue, as the emotional exchanges in this rather staid group
demonstrated. Based on a paper
presented by John W. Clower, a
graduate student at Indiana University, our discussion proved immediately that however rational
and theoretical a piece of writing is,
it can light a bonfire when it touches
the appropriate combination of interest, fear, idealism, and despair.
Clower's paper referred to several
competency reformers, as well as to
their opponents, members of what
he calls a professional educationist
elite. Most striking among the former group is a Rev. Tim LaHaye, a
founder of Christian Heritage College in California, and chairman of
the American Coalition for Traditional Values. LaHaye believesand I have heard this numberless
times myself from sources much
closer to home than Californiathat there is some direct relationship between a decline in traditional moral values in this country and
the decline in scores on national
standardized tests. Presumably this
equation still works, even though
test scores last year were slightly
better than the previous year instead
of worse. I did not notice any significant improvement in the moral
tone of television comedy or political speechifying, but perhaps I am
obtuse. In any case, LaHaye's remedies for the situation, according to
his book The Battle for the Public
Schools (1983), include competency
testing of students in subjects that
are, according to him, non-ideological: "reading, writing, math, geography, physics, and other subjects
that provide a child with basic information and skills."
The Cresset

I find this curious. Here is a demand that teachers be held economically accountable for a student's
learning, but what the student is
learning is not the responsibility of
the teacher, but of the person or
group that sets up the test or the
grading of the test. Several examples
from the discussion group disclosed
instances in which a whole district's
results were graded and evaluated
by some distant corporate entity
whose sole claim to the responsibility was that their "package" was most
acceptable to the local school board.
Of course we have become accustomed to any number of standardized tests administered on a large
scale, the SAT, GRE, or MCAT
being just a few. What then is different, and upsetting, about national
or regional standardized testing of
student achievement in the lower
grades and high school?
Two things, at least to start with.
One is the large question of what
the tests should measure. One fairly
simple way to say this is that in our
society, different groups tend to
value different qualities in their
children. For instance, some sociologists have found that blue-collar
workers put a high value on obedience and conformity to external
rules, while white-collar groups
value independence, creativity, and
curiosity.
It might be argued that testing
student competency in composition
surely would not need to get involved in such problems, but this
is far from being the case. Several
different stands can be taken on the
issue of where to put the comma in
a compound sentence. And in more
complex areas of composition alone,
there are a dozen different standpoints from which one would judge
the competency of a piece of student
writing. Should a child learn a set
of rules that will enable him to
"know" where to place the comma
in every situation? Or should he be
competent enough to write his way
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around a comma difficulty by more
flexible and inventive structures? I
cannot believe that the same kinds
of differences about what constitutes
competency do not obtain in other
areas of learning than in English
composition.
The second upsetting dimension
is the introduction of economic responsibility without any authority
to control the terms . We do, as a
society, tend to think that people
will be, in a free economy, rewarded
according to their fitness and competence. But generally this principle
supposes that the producer has made
the decisions and done the actions
that result in the product. If you
don't build a better mousetrap, people will not beat a path to your door,
and you will have to improve your
mousetrap or go into some other
line of work. But the analogy does
not hold up where schooling is concerned because teachers don't "produce" educated people in the way
that Ford produces trucks or Amalgamated Widget produces mousetraps.

The teachers I listened
to at the conference
were filled with despair.
While it is doubtless true that
many high school graduates can't
read simple instructions, or even
labels, and few clerks know what to
do with money unless the machine
calculates change for them, why
should the person in the classroom
take the rap? The last person in the
chain of command, the person with
so little autonomy that his textbooks
are chosen by somebody else, his
students put into and removed from
his classroom at all hours without
his permission or advice, his working hours subject to the interruption
of every conceivable program and
activity-this is the person we will
say should be responsible for the
competency of the young?

Every study of education concludes that however much money
you spend on an educational system, whatever facilities and hardware and software you include, the
single most significant element in a
student's ability to learn is the attitude he comes with from his home
and family environment. But because our society is experiencing
large-scale problems in this unmanageable realm, we are considering
making the teacher pay for everybody's failures.
The teachers I listened to at the
conference were filled with despair,
and it seems to me that the principal
reason for this is that as a nation we
have come almost to the end of our
noble effort with public education.
We have no consensus about what
should be taught in our multi-million dollar facilities, we do not want
to compensate those who teach in
them at a level commensurate with
the value we say we attach to their
work, and we cannot agree on a position from which to judge competency in a number of areas. We are
not at all sure that we can agree on
what tasks our young people ought
to be competent for; do we really
mean to be teaching obedience and
conformity so as to produce a drone
class? If so, it ought to be possible
to do it lots more cheaply. If competency tests are set up to measure
levels of attainment, what do we
mean to do with those who cannot
possibly measure up? Are our tests
a way of preserving an elite-those
who make up and administer and
evaluate the tests?
Our frustration with young people who cannot read and calculate
after thousands of dollars have been
spent to educate them should not
lead us to leap to competency testing as a solution. Trying to read
our goals for public education, and
trying to calculate the almost incalculable mess education is in, proves
that none of us IS as competent as
we need to be.

••••
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Review Essay

Literature as
Luminosity
Jill Baumgaertner

Light
By Eva Figes. New York: Pantheon
Books. 91 pp. $10.95.

Consider light. You wake in the
night and know that soon the corners of the dresser will become visible, the window shades gray. Light
will leak around the edges of the
draperies and seep into the corners
of the room. You will wake, even on
a gloomy day, to light and shadow,
to the muted pastel or the rich darkness of your own flesh in the mist of
the shower, to brilliant white milk
poured in a smooth stream into the
black coffee, its steam capturing the
light and wafting it, twisting it into
wreaths and out of them.
Sometime during the day you will
squint against the brightness of the
sunshine on the snow or on the sand
or on the hot highways, glinting
with chrome. You will realize later
that the colors are deepening, the
air is full of shadows, and as you
pull into your driveway, the kit-
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chen light will be already on and
you will see a head, an arm, a bright
flash of clothing moving across the
room behind the glass.
Your final gesture of the day,
after you have climbed into the
warm darkness of the blankets, is to
reach to turn off the lamp. You lie
in complete shadow now, with only
the glow of the clock face and finally
your dreams, luminous with movement.
Light is, for the sighted, the medium in which we live our lives. It is,
most particularly, the painter's
medium, and the poet's, and in Eva
Figes' book, Light, one is able to observe both at work. This is a book
about one day in the life of Claude
Monet and his family and it is written with the sensitivity of the artist
who understands what light means.
For Monet light was the subject of
art itself. For Figes light takes on
literal and figurative and philosophical meanings as she plays image
against image in her attempt to capture in words what light is and how
Monet, the greatest of light's devotee's, was obsessed by it.
Sight is not the only sense in this
book. The smell of dawn, of mint,
of roses, of "night scents and dew on
earth and foliage"; the sound of
water, of footsteps on the bridge,
the warm buzz of the bee in the sunshine; the taste of the strawberries,
the liqueur, the whipped cream; the
feel of fresh air on the bare feet of a
child who is normally crinolined
and cinctured into suffocationthese are the poet's images and these
are the reason this book burns like
a sharp flame in one's memory
weeks and months after one has read
it.
Light in Light is the passing of
time. It is active and acted upon .
The trees take light from the house,
their texture at dawn, "seem[ing] to
pull all darkness into itself." Claude
rushes to catch it.
The. light changes as constantly
as the point of view shifts. Figes lin-

gers in the mind of a character for a
paragraph or a page before the picture shifts slightly and she enters the
consciousness of another. We see
from the eyes of, among others, the
new maid, the abbe, the gardener,
Claude himself, his small granddaughter Lily, his stepdaughters,
and his wife, who grieves for her
recently deceased daughter Suzanne.
Then from the third person limited
or the first person point of view
Figes switches momentarily to the
third person omniscient, like a god
standing outside of the scene, observing it in the midst of creating it.
The point of view is like light itself, playing here, there, shadowing
one character, highlighting another.
The effect is of people moving in
and out of a picture, although the
camera, the canvas, is never stationary-it travels into one mind,
then into another watching the first.
Frequently one fragment of this
word painting, one character's view,
is slightly distorted by itself. It is a
swift stroke, a blur, which alone
could never represent truth, but
blended and contrasted with the
other tones of the piece, it becomes
beautiful and true to human experience. The gardener who accompanies Monet on his early morning
search for the right combination of
light and shadow on the water-lilies
thinks "it odd, how this man worked,
hour after hour, in that curious solitude, looking at nothing in particular, just this same old stretch of
river where they had come to fish
and swim as boys .... "
It is odd to the non-artist. To the
gardener the water is nothing. To
Claude it is the reason for existence. His pond is his trap. He is
angry when his gardeners do not
keep its surface clean so that it can
function as a glass with which he
can capture nature itself. "Slowly,
silently, it steals over the horizon
and falls into my mirror," he thinks.
Meanwhile Monet's wife is heavy
with sorrow and regret. Her burden
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blackens her vision. She would prefer just to sleep: "She closed her
eyes to shut out the dim surroundings and tried to conjure up black,
absolute blank, but it would not
come." It would not come because
absolute blank cannot be, even in
sleep, which is full of dreams. Her
depression leads her steadily toward death, as she ceaselessly
mourns the passing of Suzanne.
Then there is Lily who is light,
light, light. Light awakens her in the
morning and spills on her bed. Light
follows her and in it she stumbles,
unwittingly, on truth. Warned not
to eat seeds for fear of cultivating
plants in her stomach, Lily muses ,
"So far each grass helm looked much
like any other, but perhaps it only
took something not just small, but
invisible to grow huge inside you."
The child contains the germ of the
woman . She is the poetry of the
family. Poetry is intense and concentrated, but Lily, paradoxically,
lightens the tone. With her we are
inside a child's mind that doesn't
yet conceive of next week or next
year. Time stretches in front of her,
as does the garden walk. Her only
function is to exist in it, like the pansies whose chins she tries to lift. She
is all light and color, and even when
she closes her eyes, she sees red, not
black.
Figes is not only a poet, she knows
poetry well. Her writing is drenched
in associations and echoes from the
great English poets. In a mood similar to one of Gerard Manley Hopkins' poems she writes, "Though the
banks were still in shadow the surface of the water in midstream shone
like shot silk, bright pink and gold,
the colour of fire . . . . " Hopkins'
line from "God's Grandeur" '-"It
will flame out like shining from
shook foil'' -lurks just beneath the
surface.
This book leads one to Monet's
paintings. In the middle of it I could
wait no longer. I rushed off to the
library for collections of his works.
january, 1985

The proof of the book's extraordinary qualities lies in Monet's paintings themselves-especially his
paintings of Giverny. There we find
Eva Figes' images. But, of course, it
is the other way around, isn't it? In
Monet, Eva Figes found her images.
But the illusion is so complete, so
expert. Figes' prose-poetry is a
painting of its own. She, in presenting a portrait of Monet and his family, has transferred impressionism
to the written word-not just the
technique of impressionism, but the
vision of light and shadow and the
intensely personal and generously
archetypal associations of those two
words.
The small stroke of this book, a
tiny interstice of life, just twentyfour hours, is as fragile and brief as
the bubbles Lily blows from her

clay pipe. She watches them grow
and burst, grow and burst until
finally, "with a flick of her wrist she
sent [one] into the air, to float upward, a clear sphere holding all the
light and colour of the world in its
transparency. The few seconds during which it held were enough for
Lily. Memory holds the shining
bubble, bright with the newborn
glory of the world."
Monet likewise finds his instant,
a perfect few seconds of light in the
early morning and he paints it and
it becomes the painting of a memory.
Light is itself a memory of imagination, an instant, a few seconds, a
mere ninety-one pages. But as in all
great literature, one glimpse is all
that is necessary. It says everything
and contains everything-grief, joy,
death, innocence, and love.
~~

Evening News
The flashing of it only mars
the finishing of supper. A
small discomfort with dessert
and washed down next with
coffee.
You didn't catch the names of
either family or street. Only that
the sky turned red and glass blew in
and everyone but one got out, and
they are safe with relatives. The
usual stuff: cops on the case,
the street cut off from traffic,
the ashes being sifted through
and who can claim the victim?
The one surprise comes with the
ring. A friend heard too, but
more. And past the window
stars regroup and moonlight blinds
and willows sob against the panes
as once again her voice in waves
is drowning you.

lois Reiner
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Weighty Matters
Dot Nuechterlein
Applause, applause: you made it
through that long-dreaded year,
1984. Oh, sure, the world saw the
usual wars and rumors of wars,
famine, rotten weather, and international nastiness, and some of us
suffered loss of loved ones, illness,
or other misfortunes. But Big
Brother didn't show up, and despite
campaign rhetoric our celebrated
way of life does not seem imminently doomed.
Thus we can now safely put aside
foolish fears and get on with what
really concerns most of us as January dawns. What is that, you may
ask? Why, the topic discussed by
every major publication, of course,
not to mention on TV talk shows
and at most cocktail parties: that
perennial problem, dieting.
It is my impression that Americans are divided into two classesthose who constantly diet (or watch
what they eat), and those who do it
only sporadically. Nearly everyone
talks or reads or thinks about it.
Now we all know, since health experts have been telling us ever since
we can remember, that many of us in
this country eat too much, eat the
wrong things, and move around too
little-as a nation we are not only
fat , but nutritionally unsound and
lazy to boot. There is no question
that the abundance of food and other
commodities in this blessed land has
led to overindulgence and waste.
And last fall our Thanksgiving feasts
were punctuated by daily news of
the teeming masses starving in Ethiopia and other African countries,
so there is a moral dimension to the
question as well.
Not long ago I read or heard that
at any given time about half of all
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Americans are dieting. Sounds
great, huh? Sounds like people are
becoming more concerned about
health and fitness, and are acting responsibly in taking control of themselves and their lives. But there is a
kicker in the stats-among all of
those dieters a high proportion are
trying to lose just five to ten pounds.
While relatively light losses like
that can be awfully hard to accomplish, they do not indicate that a
whole new way of life is underway.
Rather, what we seem to have
here is a national obsession with
that all-American fetish, Personal
Appearance. Now far be it from me
to criticize anyone who wants to improve her or his appearance; looking good often leads to feeling good
about oneself, which often leads to
getting along better with others and
being more content with one's lot in
life and all sorts of other nice things.
But we are not talking obesity here.
When huge numbers of us seem to
think that we will reach our ideal
self-image if we drop five to ten
ugly ones, methinks perhaps there
is something funny about the socially acceptable pictures of what
we ought to be that we carry around
in our heads.
Females have the most trouble
with this whole business. For one
thing, women are much more likely
than men to be reacted to .on the
basis of their looks. I often show my
classes a videotape of two women
discussing beauty pageants for
young teens. A pageant director insists that twelve-year-old girls
ought to get started with make-up
and styles and modeling techniques,
because young ladies have to begin
thinking about how to catch a man .
"Being smart is okay," she says, "but
nine times out of ten a girl has to be
attractive before any man will pay
attention to her."
The developmental psychologist
she is talking to is appalled. "Surely
the whole personality is what matters," she exclaims. "Surely it is

beauty that is incidental, not brains."
My students usually decide that the
psychologist is talking about what
ought to be, but the director is telling it like it is.
Secondly, a woman's physiology
is stacked against her. Lean and lissome may be characteristic of the
young, but hormones and such decree that that is atypical of the mature female of most of the ethnic
groups inhabiting the U.S. Indeed,
even the young and gorgeous in
our society rarely seem satisfied with
how they look; they diet as much as
their mothers do and many are
afflicted with severe eating disorders
as they try to attain an unrealistic
standard of thinness.
Like most everyone, I admit from
time to time that my own appearance is not too thrilling and I attempt to do something about it.
When I got serious about running
several years ago the shifting of the
lumps and bumps was a nice bonus;
now I discover that I have become
so healthy that the more I run (four
or more hours per week) the more
efficient my body becomes at using
fuel- to stay where I am I must
either run less or eat less, or both.
What a royal pain! Dieting in
earnest takes lots of time and energy,
assets I prefer to spend on work or
family or fun; and I know from
others that the price of staying slim
is absolute unyielding eternal vigilance. Besides, having come from a
home where we never, ever could
afford to go out for meals, dinner
for two is now my favorite form of
recreation. (joke: What does the
busy woman executive make for
dinner? Reservations.)
Maybe we should go back to worrying about 1984. In George Orwell's
vision food was utilitarian and the
problem was getting enough to eat,
not the effects of having too much of
the good stuff. Besides, if Big
Brother were watching us, he probably wouldn't even care what we
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look like.
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